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Regional Oral History Office
The Bancroft Library

University of California
Berkeley, California

Government History Documentation Project
Ronald Reagan Gubernatorial Era

Ed Reinecke

MAVERICK REPUBLICAN CONGRESSMAN AND
LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR FOR CALIFORNIA, 1965-1974

An Interview Conducted by
Sarah L. Sharp
in 1984

Cops. No. 1

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LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR ED REINECKE

CA. 1970

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PREFACE

California government and politics from 1966 through 1974 are the focus of the Reagan Gubernatorial Era Series of the state Government History Documentation Project, conducted by the Regional Oral History Office of The Bancroft Library with the participation of the oral history programs at the Davis and Los Angeles campuses of the University of California, Claremont Graduate School, and California State University at Fullerton. This series of interviews carries forward studies of significant issues and processes in public administration begun by the Regional Oral History Office in 1969. In previous series, interviews with over 220 legislators, elected and appointed officials, and others active in public life during the governorships of Earl Warren, Goodwin Knight, and Edmund Brown, Sr., were completed and are now available to scholars.

The first unit in the Government History Documentation Project, the Earl Warren Series, produced interviews with Warren himself and others centered on key developments in politics and government administration at the state and county level, innovations in criminal justice, public health, and social welfare from 1925-1953. Interviews in the Knight-Brown Era continued the earlier inquiries into the nature of the governor's office and its relations with executive departments and the legislature, and explored the rapid social and economic changes in the years 1953-1966, as well as preserving Brown's own account of his extensive political career. Among the issues documented were the rise and fall of the Democratic party; establishment of the California Water Plan; election law changes, reapportionment and new political techniques; education and various social programs.

During Ronald Reagan's years as governor, important changes became evident in California government and politics. His administration marked an end to the progressive period which had provided the determining outlines of government organization and political strategy since 1910 and the beginning of a period of limits in state policy and programs, the extent of which is not yet clear. Interviews in this series deal with the efforts of the administration to increase government efficiency and economy and with organizational innovations designed to expand the management capability of the governor's office, as well as critical aspects of state health, education, welfare, conservation, and criminal justice programs. Legislative and executive department narrators provide their perspectives on these efforts and their impact on the continuing process of legislative and elective politics.

Work began on the Reagan Gubernatorial Era Series in 1979. Planning and research for this phase of the project were augmented by participation of other oral history programs with experience in public affairs. Additional advisors were selected to provide relevant background for identifying persons to be interviewed and understanding of issues to be documented. Project research files, developed by the Regional Oral History Office staff to provide a systematic background for questions, were updated to add personal, topical, and chronological data for the Reagan period to the existing base of information for 1925 through 1966, and to supplement research by participating programs as needed. Valuable, continuing assistance in preparing for interviews was provided by the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, which houses the Ronald Reagan Papers, and by the State Archives in Sacramento.

An effort was made to select a range of interviewees that would reflect the increase in government responsibilities and that would represent diverse points of view. In general, participating programs were contracted to conduct interviews on topics with which they have particular expertise, with persons presently located nearby. Each interview is identified as to the originating institution. Most interviewees have been queried on a limited number of topics with which they were personally connected; a few narrators with unusual breadth of experience have been asked to discuss a multiplicity of subjects. When possible, the interviews have traced the course of specific issues leading up to and resulting from events during the Reagan administration in order to develop a sense of the continuity and interrelationships that are a significant aspect of the government process.

Throughout Reagan's years as governor, there was considerable interest and speculation concerning his potential for the presidency; by the time interviewing for this project began in late 1980, he was indeed president. Project interviewers have attempted, where appropriate, to retrieve recollections of that contemporary concern as it operated in the governor's office. The intent of the present interviews, however, is to document the course of California government from 1967 to 1974, and Reagan's impact on it. While many interviewees frame their narratives of the Sacramento years in relation to goals and performance of Reagan's national administration, their comments often clarify aspects of the gubernatorial period that were not clear at the time. Like other historical documentation, these oral histories do not in themselves provide the complete record of the past. It is hoped that they offer firsthand experience of passions and personalities that have influenced significant events past and present.

The Reagan Gubernatorial Era Series was begun with funding from the California legislature via the office of the Secretary of State and continued through the generosity of various individual donors. Several memoirs have been funded in part by the California Women in Politics Project under a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities, including a matching grant from the Rockefeller Foundation; by the Sierra Club Project also under a NEH grant; and by the privately funded Bay Area State and Regional Planning Project. This joint funding has enabled staff working with narrators and topics related to several projects to expand the scope and thoroughness of each individual interview involved by careful coordination of their work.

The Regional Oral History Office was established to tape record autobiographical interviews with persons significant in the history of California and the West. The Office is under the administrative direction of James D. Hart, Director of the Bancroft Library, and Willa Baum, head of the Office. Copies of all interviews in the series are available for research use in The Bancroft Library, UCLA Department of Special Collections, and the State Archives in Sacramento. Selected interviews are also available at other manuscript depositories.

July 1982
Regional Oral History Office
486 The Bancroft Library
University of California at Berkeley

Gabrielle Morris
Project Director

On behalf of future scholars, the Regional Oral History Office wishes to thank those who have responded to the Office's request for funds to continue documentation of Ronald Reagan's years as governor of California. Donors to the project are listed below.

Anonymous

Margaret Brock

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David Packard

Robert O. Reynolds

Henry and Grace Salvatori

Porter Sesnon

Dean A. Watkins

*deceased

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

(Please print or write clearly)

Your full name Edmund Dickinson

Date of birth 1-1-29 Place of birth Alameda, Calif.

Father's full name Frederick Dickinson

Birthplace Pittsburg, Kan.

Occupation Engineer, Iron Works

Mother's full name William Adams

Birthplace Alameda, Calif.

Occupation Manager, Alameda County Jail

Where did you grow up? Alameda, Berkeley Hills, San Francisco

Present community San Jose, Calif., or Miami

Education HS School, San Jose, 11. 1945

1947) Univ. of Calif. at Berkeley

Occupation(s) Report. at Alameda County Jail

Report. at Alameda County Jail

Manager, Alameda County Jail

Special interests or activities HS. School, San Jose

HS. School, San Jose

HS. School, San Jose

HS. School, San Jose

HS. School, San Jose

I BIOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND

[Interview 1: June 26, 1984]##

Family and Education

Sharp: This is really part of a larger project that we started in 1969, long before I came to the office, focusing on California state government. Originally, the project was funded by the National Endowment for the Humanities. Funding shifted over to the state of California during the years that we were doing the Goodwin Knight/Pat Brown project. Now our funding is primarily private donations of different sorts. So the project has gone through quite an evolution. There's a lot of continuity: we have spent a great deal of time talking to people in the governor's office as well as in the lieutenant governor's offices and--

Reinecke: This is tremendous, though, really, because you're going to get a lot of input here that you would never get out of just the printed material that comes as a history after any administration. Okay, shoot.

Sharp: I thought we might start with some basic information and that means your telling me a little about your growing up. I know that you were born in Oregon in 1924, and I know you ended up in California at some point--you went to CIT--but what's in between there?

Reinecke: Okay, well, first of all, my family is from Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. My mother and dad were both born there. They migrated--my two brothers and sister, all older than I--were all born back there.

##This symbol indicates that a tape or a segment of a tape has begun or ended. For a guide to the tapes see page 86.

Reinecke: I was the only one born on the west coast. Dad came to California in about 1922, I believe it was. They were living in Glendale, down in southern California. My grandmother on my mother's side lived in Medford, Oregon, and ran a maternity home. So when it was time to give birth to me, my mother decided to go home to her mother, and that's why I was born in Medford. As soon as we were both able to travel--and I don't recall much of it--we came back to Glendale, and that's where my whole life has been: Glendale, LA, and Beverly Hills (down in the beanfields down there around Pico at the time).

We were in Los Angeles, but because we were so far from any LA school, they allowed us to go to grammar school and high school in Beverly Hills. So I actually went through the Beverly Hills school system even though we didn't live in Beverly Hills. Later, we did move into a duplex just inside of the Beverly Hills limit.

But that was it. Soon out of school, I came up to Richmond. I wanted to go to [University of California at] Berkeley cause my brother had. I got a job in the Kaiser shipyards working on the outfitting docks. I intended to work and pay my way through school. I was only eighteen then and World War II had just started. Well, the school would not allow me to work forty-eight hours a week and take a full freshman course also, and they obviously were smarter than I was. So, I said I'd save enough money by working four or five months, then I could go down to UCLA, because in another year I'd be in the service anyway. So I went to UCLA and I did register, but I was late, got a terrible schedule. One day I was on my way home and I met a fellow who had just joined the navy under a new program that sounded kind of interesting, in electronics. So I dropped out of UCLA after two weeks and joined the navy.

So at eighteen, I went into the navy. I took some examinations. I'd been a fairly decent student on the science and the technical side, so I succeeded very well in those tests, and got a second-class petty officer's rating even before I signed up to enlist. So I entered as a radio technician, second-class.

After three and a half years, for the last six months, they put me into officers' training. I spent a couple of months at Princeton as a refresher course, then one semester at Cal Tech [California Institute of Technology], then one semester at USC [University of Southern California], then I was discharged. And these were all kind of condensed semesters, so it only took about, I guess it was about seven months.

Reinecke: I went to work for my dad for the summer, then took the entrance exam and started academic work at Cal Tech. I started over as a freshman even though I'd had some college-level work in the officers' training courses. I graduated in 1950 with a bachelor's degree in mechanical engineering, and I'm a registered engineer.

A year before I graduated, my dad had a very serious heart attack, extremely serious. He was pronounced dead, but he didn't die. Then right after that, his whole company burned down, so my two brothers and I decided to jump in. I'd go over whenever I didn't have homework or on weekends and we'd--actually, we sifted ashes with screens just to find the metal parts that we could sell for scrap, and that was the capital that we started back into business with. It was just a 100 percent loss.

Running for Congress as an Unknown in 1964

Reinecke: I stayed in his business--it became a family business, up until I resigned as president in 1963, the fall, in order to run for Congress in 1964. It was the 27th Congressional District, which is basically the San Fernando Valley and the Antelope Valley and Saugus, Newhall. I was elected--it was quite an upset--and then I was re-elected very well the next two elections.

And in January of '69, sitting at home one night, I got a call: "Ed?"

And I said, "Yes."

He said, "This is Ron."

I said, "Ron, who?"

And he said, "Ronald Reagan."

I'd heard that they were considering me as the replacement for Bob Finch, but there had been no communication whatsoever, so it was kind of an unusual beginning. I didn't really know him very well. A lot of people assume this was a big, behind-the-scenes type thing, but I had met the governor maybe twice at dinners, political type dinners, and I did go to Sacramento to his inauguration with my wife, but that's our total experience--relationship--prior to his appointing me. To this day, I don't know why he appointed me.

Sharp: Let me just back you up a little bit. I wanted to get some more information on your running for Congress. The person that you beat was Everett Burkhalter?

Reinecke: No, Everett Burkhalter had been the incumbent, but he was muscled out of the race by Jesse Unruh. Oh, this other guy, now on our supreme court, I can't even say his name. And Alan Cranston. There were three of them. Oh, jeez, you know it--anyway, he's still on the court. A very obvious partisan Democrat whose name escapes me right now.

Anyway, the three of them-- And the reason I know this is Mr. Burkhalter had a secretary who was a lovely lady, and she was highly offended at this whole thing--that these three heavies would come in and just twist this guy's arm off and beat him over the head with it. And so much so, that she came out for me. She was a lifelong Democrat. Always, but she was so totally offended by this action by Unruh, and [whistle] and Cranston, that she came out and signed a letter of endorsement for me.

But anyway, so Burkhalter did not run. He was used to flush out the prior Republican who was a member of the John Birch Society member named Edgar Hiestand. And he got "Eck" because old Burkey was a long-time city councilman. He knew everybody in the district. So he flushed out Hiestand after reapportionment, and then he was told to get out so Tom Bane could run.

Tom Bane was an assemblyman in that district, and Tom was the chairman of the Rules Committee up here in Sacramento, in fact, chairman of reapportionment. So, he had reapportioned the state partly to his own use. And he was Unruh's right-hand man. In fact, one time I went to a dinner--it was sort of a farewell dinner for Tom Bane before he went to Washington. And Unruh was there, and the others, and he mentioned that, "Now Tom is going to be my voice in Washington." This is when Jesse was still "Big Daddy" of the assembly--was the speaker. And so it was kind of interesting that we upset him, and of course, that whole thing.

And the interesting, tiny bit of history there, is that when Bane decided not to run for the assembly, to run for Congress, and I ran against him, he had a young kid, an accountant in his office, that was his field deputy. The kid was named Bob Moretti. So Bob decided to fill Tom Bane's seat. So Bob ran and was elected to the 42nd Assembly District the same time I was elected to the 27th Congressional. Bob and I remained very good friends even though we're on opposite sides of the fence. I don't know of anybody in

Reinecke: the whole political scene that was any closer than Bob and myself. And interesting enough, we both went out of office in 1974, running for governor at the same time Tom Bane came back in again. So it was a complete 1'ronde situation.

Sharp: I saw that Moretti's office was downstairs in this same building.

Reinecke: Yes. It was. Really sad.*

Sharp: His name is still on the door.

Reinecke: Is it really? Gosh, that was a real shocker. At age forty-seven or whatever.

Sharp: Our companion office at Cal State [California State University at] Fullerton just finished an interview with Mr. Moretti.** And we were pleased that someone spent some time documenting him.

Reinecke: That's wonderful. He was a fascinating guy and a very competent person. Very honest. His honesty was his major attribute.

Sharp: And real dynamic.

Reinecke: Yes, very.

Sharp: I have seen a couple of notes about Edgar Hiestand, and that perhaps he might have encouraged you to run or--

Reinecke: No, I didn't even know him.

I was encouraged, or let's say, I was challenged to run. I was never encouraged to run by anybody, because I was a total unknown. I didn't even know what a precinct was. In fact, I'd been a Democrat until 1960. And Pat [Edmund G., Sr.] Brown turned me around and made a Republican out of me. (I told that story once in kind of a funny way where Pat was moderating a debate between Jerry [Edmund G. Brown, Jr.] and myself.) So I was a Democrat and started off by voting for Harry Truman and from then on forward, and then in 1960 I re-registered as a Republican.

*Robert Moretti, died on 12 May 1984.

**See "Recollections of an Assembly Speaker," Legislative-Governor Relations in the Reagan Years: Five Views, Oral History Program, California State University Fullerton, 1983.

Reinecke: Glen [Glenard P.] Lipscomb, another congressman from out in-- well, he gradually moved out into the Pomona area through reapportionment. He was in the same Kiwanis Club I was in. And he was the only contact I had ever had with any level of government. I never knew a city clerk or dog catcher or anything else. But I did know Glen. Once or twice a year he would come to the Kiwanis Club. So when I was traveling around the country in my business on sales work, I would occasionally stop in. I got to know a little about Washington. I enjoyed it, and even used to jokingly say I'd never live anywhere in the United States east of the Rockies except for Washington. I'd be willing to come to Washington because I thought it was a fine place.

And so one day I went in there, and I was complaining about everything. He said, "Then quit bitching and go run for something."

I said, "No way, that's not my bag, Glen."

But a year later, I came back and I said, "You know, I thought about it. What do I do now?"

He said, "Where do you live?" And I told him.

"And where's your business?" And I told him.

He said, "Well, the congressman that's there now is named Edgar Hiestand, and he's going to be defeated this time because he was just reapportioned very drastically out of his district. If you want to learn, go out and work in his campaign just to find out what it's all about. And if you like it, stick around and maybe in two years you can run."

That's it. That's all that was ever said to me.

Sharp: So that was '6--

Reinecke: That was actually in '62. And he was defeated in '62. Then Burkhalter was the congressman from '62 to '64. And I ran in '64.

Sharp: What relationship was there between you and the party structure when you were running?

Reinecke: I didn't know a soul. I was such an unknown and such a guaranteed loser that even the media didn't know where my headquarters was on the night of election. They had to come out the following day to interview me. It was the only upset in the western half of the

Reinecke: United States. The only new Republican win. Oh, George Hansen, who is now in trouble in Idaho, was elected that same year. And he was the only other one west of the Mississippi that was elected that wasn't an incumbent. So he and I were the only congressional news west of the Mississippi, so to speak. I'm sorry, and one other one in Oregon, Wendell Wyatt, but he replaced another Republican in a very posh district.

But I just had no relationship with the party. We didn't get a nickel out of them until the last week. They took a poll-- somebody did, I never found out who. Because, see, we only raised \$22,000 in our whole campaign for Congress. Compare that with today, and it's pretty awesome. But, anyway, the last few days of our campaign, they did come in with, I think it was \$15,000 or \$18,000. So we wound up spending about \$40,000 all together. But it was so late that some of it, frankly, was not well spent. But I had no relationship and no friends.

Sharp: So no relationship with the Goldwater campaign--

Reinecke: No.

Sharp: --or the Rockefeller campaign?

Reinecke: Oh, no, none whatsoever.

Sharp: Were your folks in politics at all?

Reinecke: My dad was a strong labor Democrat. And that's why I became a Democrat until I watched things go on. Dad took over his father's business back in Pittsburgh when his dad died. My dad dropped out of school in the eighth grade to run the family business (it was a wholesale produce business), and he did very well, retired, came to California, had nothing to do. At thirty-five, he was retired and comfortable until the stock market dropped him out of that comfortable position.

He became a contractor installing automatic sprinkler systems in the very large estates--this is back in the early twenties, when very few people had sprinkler systems and nobody had them with a clock on it. Dad always liked specialty-type things. He worked with the Doheneys and all the Getz' estate and a lot of the big names--the Firestones and so forth, in the days of those big estates up in Beverly Hills, and Santa Barbara and so forth. The business hit the skids in the Depression like everybody else's, and then he got shut down completely during World War II because of

Reinecke: the use of copper. So he went to work for, of all people, Howard Hughes, for several years. Just as a material expeditor, he wasn't anything big. But then he got back in the sprinkler business again.

Then my two brothers and I took it over after the fire. We brought the whole concept of controllers out of the mechanical/hydraulic age into electronics. And they're pretty much today what they were when my brother-in-law and I first developed the initial electronic controller back in the early fifties.

[interruption]

Sharp: There are a couple of other people that I wondered about. When you put your campaign together, did you have any assistance from UROC [United Republicans of California], Rus Walton and Joe [Joseph C.] Shell?

Reinecke: I knew Rus. I didn't get any help from him. And I met Joe somewhere along the line, I don't recall where. But no, we were just a little satellite operation.

In fact, the funny story: There were five key people in my campaign. Myself, as a candidate; this guy named Bob McGee, as my manager; Addie Banks, who was a press girl--I picked her up one day, walking the precincts. I knocked on the door and she didn't have anything to do. She said, "I'll help you"; and Tommy Burwald who was just a gofer, a young kid; and Beverly Micholson who was another Republican who wanted to help. And so there were five of us.

We didn't know until after the election was over that not one of us had ever been in an organized campaign before. We were five absolute neophytes that just didn't know how to lose. The odds were so much against us, that nobody would take the campaign, except these five totally inexperienced people that just--. We only knew how to win. And we did.

Sharp: You know, this was about the time that Stu [Stuart K.] Spencer and Bill [William E.] Roberts and some of those people turned out to be very creative, skilled, campaign professionals. Were you aware that there were those kinds of people out there?

Reinecke: Stu and Bill ran the assembly candidate for Newt Russell the same year. And Newt's district was roughly half of my congressional district. And so, yes, I was aware of them. But I didn't have the money for them, anyway. It was just a seat-of-the-pants type thing.

Sharp: Did you know Frank [J.] Walton at that time?*

Reinecke: No. I met Frank when he ran for Congress--I think it was in '66 or something.

Sharp: No, it was '64.

Reinecke: Was it '64? I went to one dinner where he spoke, and that's the only time I'd ever seen or heard of him. And I'm not even sure I met him at that point. But I did travel out to somewhere out in Monrovia--someplace like that--where he gave a speech, and that's my first knowledge of him.

Sharp: He was running in the 25th Congressional District.

Reinecke: Okay, that's right. And he was defeated.

Sharp: But I wondered what sort of event might have brought you to together at that point?

Reinecke: That was it. And then I don't think I saw him again until I got up here to Sacramento six or seven years later.

Two Terms in Congress, 1965-1969

The House Interior Committee: Struggles over the Grand Canyon Dams, the Clean Air Act of 1967, and a Southern California Pipeline

Sharp: Could you just give me some highlights of some of the main issues that you had to deal with as a congressman?

Reinecke: As a congressman, you mean--not in the campaign?

Sharp: Right. Let's go ahead and move on.

Reinecke: All right. I was, because I was a mechanical engineer, sort of technically oriented; I was always interested in water and energy. So I asked for and received the assignment in the Interior Committee. And so I spent a great deal of time on those works. Then an opening

*See an oral history with Frank Walton, "Transportation Policies and the Politics of Conservatism, 1964-1974," in this same series.

Reinecke: came along and I managed to get on the Merchant Marine Committee, also, because oceanography is another very sincere interest of mine, having been a sort of an old skin diver type.

And so, those were my two committees. The major effort in that first--well, the whole first four years, I should say--was fighting the two dams in the Grand Canyon. That--the Central Arizona Project, as they call it--was one of the major pieces of legislation that we dealt with. And I took it on, not from the standpoint of environmentalists, although I had just gone down the river with Georgie White a year or two before, so I knew the canyon and I loved it and so forth.

But I took it on from an engineering point of view or an economics point of view. I convinced myself that the dam was not economically feasible even though the Department of Interior said so. And I managed to prove it. I was told later by one of Scoop [Henry] Jackson's staff that, had it not been for my testimony before our Interior Committee--because Scoop always had a couple of his staff people over sitting in on our deliberations as we went through this--

Because the dams were the big glitch. Nobody argued about the Central Arizona thing. It was a question about the allocation of the water, the 4.4, and the 2.8 and the .3. But most of all: Should we flood the Grand Canyon? And the Sierra Club--that was really the issue that brought the Sierra Club into existence, or to prominence, I should say. In fact, the Sierra Club was using my office back there. I don't consider myself--I never belonged to the Sierra Club, but I was sympathetic with their thoughts on this thing, mine being from a standpoint of economics and engineering.

So I did an awful lot of work on that thing and proved to my satisfaction that the dams were not feasible, tried to make that presentation to the committee. I was voted down. But in the process of making all that presentation and all those remarks to the Secretary of Interior and everybody else that testified, Scoop's people picked that up and when that bill went before the Senate Interior Committee, of which Scoop was the chairman, he said, "Look, if the dams are included, we're not even going to hold hearings." So it was a foregone conclusion that the dams were out or we're not even going to talk about Central Arizona. And so that's the way the dams went down the tube. Kind of interesting.

Reinecke: John Saylor on our Interior Committee was the House member of the Sierra Club, so to speak, and he presented all the environmental type issues. I found such incredible gaps in Interior's logic--in terms of economics and engineering, in the long-range economic feasibility--that I didn't even have to touch those environmental subjects. I stayed strictly to the business side of the thing. And was successful.

So that was the most major-- I did a lot of other things in addition to that in the House, but, if there was any outstanding thing, that was it.

Sharp: Some other issues that had California interests at heart?

Reinecke: Well, one was on the Clean Air Act of 1967, I believe that was. The feds finally realized that there was air pollution, and they decided to set national standards. California was already ahead of the national standards, so what we wanted was to try to develop an amendment that would allow us to continue our more forward, more strict position on air quality standards. And we were fighting the feds all the way.

Senator George Murphy managed to introduce an amendment in the Senate and got it in very nicely, but then there was a real scrap in the House. I took the position of the leadership on that amendment in the House, along with John Moss, a Democrat, from Sacramento here. John, unfortunately, was overseas most of the time. He was on the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee. So he was gone most of the time. So it was left up to me. We managed to get the amendment included so that California was allowed to continue its more strict rules than the feds wanted to set. So that was a strictly parochial type thing where there were strictly California interests.

Another thing I did--I don't know whatever happened to it--I managed to get an amendment tacked onto a bill. It was really sort of--well, I won't say it was improper, but it was unusual. It was authorizing a feasibility study of a pipeline that went down off the north coast of California, that brought water from the north to the south, offshore on the bottom of the ocean. A twenty- or thirty-foot diameter fiberglass pipe. Really, what I was aiming at was, of course, the Columbia River. But I didn't dare say it or I'd get the whole northwestern block of votes against me. So I just said, "Look, we've got a lot of water going into the ocean every year in northern California. We'd like to just scoop that up maybe a hundred feet above sea level--it's called an inverted siphon--and the water would go in one end and come out at

Reinecke: Ventura or Oxnard or wherever you want it, and provide lots of water for southern California." It's still not all that bad an idea. The study did go through, but by the time it was finished, I was out of the Congress and I don't know whatever happened to it.

Relationships Within California's Congressional Delegation

Sharp: I would be interested to know two things in particular. One, just some notes about your working within the congressional delegation from California, because we don't know very much about that.

Reinecke: There wasn't much--Oh, I'd say there was excellent cooperation on a one-to-one basis, but there was no organized effort at all. The only meeting--in fact it offended me...

Gosh, just a little aside: Since the California group never got together, I decided to throw a cocktail party at my house. I was single, but I had a nice house out on Lake Barcoft. So this crazy Bob McGee that I mentioned in my campaign, he and I put together a swinging party, and had a classical guitarist upstairs during dinner and a dance band downstairs. We had everything going great. And all of a sudden, nobody wanted to come. There was just no social mix of the Democrats and the Republicans, and even very few Republicans. But as it turned out, it was a good party. Probably fifteen or twenty guys did show, but I had to twist their arms to get them to come out and eat my dinners and drink my cocktails.

But anyway, the point being that there was very little interrelationship on an organized basis. The only time I think we ever had a meeting was on that crazy Century Freeway that still is not resolved. That's in southern California. And nothing happened then. Chet Holifield was the chairman of the Democrats and Glen Lipscomb was the chairman of the Republicans, and while they were polite and courteous to one another, they just didn't bother organizing any kind of business.

Sharp: There were some like Bob Wilson--people who had been there for some time--

Reinecke: Most of them had all been elected in 1952. It was a class that went in right after the reapportionment which favored the Republicans back in '52. And so H. Allen Smith of Glendale, Craig Hosmer, Bob Wilson as you mentioned--

Sharp: Don Clausen--was he there?

Reinecke: No, Don came in later. Jimmy [James B.] Utt from Orange County, Charlie [Charles M.] Teague from Ventura, I think Del [William S.] Mailliard from San Francisco. At that time the Republican party had the whole coastline of California. Just all the coastal districts turned out to be Republicans and Glenard was inland. There may have been a couple others, but there were about six or seven that came in in that '52 group. And they were kind of a hard little core. Great guys, no problem--I think they saw each other socially, dinners and so forth at their own homes--but there just was very little that went on in an organized fashion as a delegation. Period.

Sharp: Then there were newer ones that came in like yourslef. Al [Alphonzo E.] Bell [Jr.] came in.

Reinecke: Yes, Al Bell, Don Clausen, Del Clawson, a guy from Salinas-- Burt Talcott anyway, Burt and myself and then [Robert B.] Mathias and Chuck...Chuck...the great guy who was on Watergate Committee, the one that held out for [Richard M.] Nixon so long. God, I'm embarrassed. And I haven't got a picture of him around here right now. [Chuck Wiggins] Jerry [L.] Pettis was another one that came in late.

Sharp: One of the other issues is that changing status of the California state college system which during the period that you were in Congress, opened a Washington, D.C. office. And John Kehoe was the representative of the system at that time, and spent quite a bit of time trying to get federal monies to come to the state colleges for research and teachers.

Reinecke: That's interesting, I don't even remember that. I have no recollection of that.

Sharp: Well, it would have been in '67. If you don't remember it, then you probably don't--

Reinecke: No, I really don't. That's interesting that he would have been back there, because Pat Brown was the governor, and John is a pretty devoted Republican.

Sharp: Well, he was appointed by Glenn Dumke.

Reinecke: Oh, I see, as an institutional type thing, okay. Yes--I wasn't aware of it. I used to date Pat Brown's secretary back there, so I had the inside skinny on everything that was going on. (I was a bachelor for the first two years I was a congressman, then I got married in '66.

The Merchant Marine Committee: Fighting the Law of the Sea Conference##

Reinecke: I'd like to say something about the work of the Merchant Marine Committee. It all started off when Jimmy [James] Roosevelt was appointed to be the congressional representative to the United Nations back in about '65, I guess it was. And he went up and introduced a resolution on the ad hoc committee on the sea beds--who was going to control the sea beds.

And it went from there. Then Ambassador Pardo from Malta came in and all of a sudden all introduced these great proposals we're still fighting. (We know it now as the Law of the Sea Conferences), which basically was an effort. And Senator Claiborne Pell introduced quite a treaty for the Senate to consider (which they never did) to basically give everything beyond the continental shelf to the jurisdiction of the United Nations.

It was a way of funding the United Nations, but it included all kinds of very authoritative powers including even military powers. So I fought that tooth and nail. We fought dragging and kicking all the way, and fortunately I had two great guys--Downing, Tom Downing, a Democrat of Newport News, Virginia, and Paul Rogers, who I think is still in the Congress, from West Palm Beach, Florida. And the three of us took it on and we managed to stop it, at least for the several years that I was there.

And after that, Jack Murphy, of New York, another Democrat who was on the Merchant Marine Committee, picked it up and he fought it very, very well. He fought this guy Joe Sisco and everybody else in the Department of Statistics, and stalled it off because it was a clear giveaway that the UN would be licensing for oil exploration off the coast of California beyond the depth of six hundred feet.

Reinecke: Well, everything we've got out here is in that area. So we would have whoever the UN wanted to authorize--whether it was the Soviets or the English or anybody else--drilling for oil in the Santa Barbara Channel without regard to our environmental concerns or our revenues. Because on the west coast, the sea bed drops down so fast that the continental shelf at that time was measured at one hundred fathoms--six hundred feet, roughly. It places the continental shelf definition a quarter of a mile offshore, because the bottom just goes down very rapidly in northern California. Down in the Gulf of Mexico it's not that much of a problem, but up here and on all the west coast of California, it was a problem. So we fought it to get it out either twenty-five miles or one hundred miles, and they're still playing with those numbers as you know.

But that was, I felt, a significant accomplishment simply because nobody gave a darn, nobody knew anything about it, nobody had a real interest, particularly on the west coast. There were just the three of us--two east coasters and myself--took this battle on, and we managed to at least sustain the thing until finally we could develop recognition of the problem. The Interior Department didn't even give a darn where the continental shelf was. So we were in a very real position of risking our environmental resources on the west coast.

Sharp: So the idea was that the revenues gotten from the drilling would support the operations of the United Nations?

Reinecke: Yes. Right.

Sharp: Whose idea was it?

Reinecke: Well, I'm not sure where. The initial thing started with Jimmy Roosevelt and then it went to UN. The next thing that came out was this Ambassador Pardo of Malta, and he introduced it. It has got a long history.

And oh, you should see the way they've drawn the maps of the world, because the landlocked nations suddenly said, "We want a piece of the action, too. We want some of that money." So they suddenly started drawing lines that would converge from national boundaries to a center point in the Atlantic Ocean, for instance. And you had where Switzerland had some coastline and Austria and Czechoslovakia and all those countries. It was just wild, whether they were going to "own" portions of it, or whatever. It has been a massive series of confusion.

Reinecke: But that was the concept: that this is the way to finance, as I saw it then (and I still see it that way), sort of a one-world-type government. They were going to draw on the major resources. We were just recognizing the nodules of molybdenum and so forth on the floor of the ocean. I was always interested in ocean and energy and water and that kind of stuff. So that was a fairly significant effort, and I felt as though I accomplished something in the process.

Sharp: That sounds really interesting.

Reinecke: Well, it's something that not very many people are even aware of, that's ever been given any consideration. You hear about the Law of the Sea Conferences, and they go on and on. I'm happy to say that even though most nations have adopted this thing, the United States has never done it, and I think it's partly because of this.

I had an interesting bit--since you're looking for little bits and pieces of history here. We had a private hearing with the State Department and the Department of Defense and our little oceanography sub-committee. And they wanted us--I recruited Dante Fascell (now chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs) from Miami. Anyway, he was the chairman of this international agreement sub-committee. That committee had to approve this thing before they could send this new draft treaty to the United Nations.

So, Paul Rogers, the Floridian and myself and Tommy Downing got together with Dante, from Miami--a great guy. He allowed us to sit on his committee during these hearings, and I guess I was the bad guy through most of it. When it was all over, we defeated the thing, and this guy from the State Department, I don't recall his name, came up to me and shook his fist in my face and said, "Congressman, let me tell you something. The average tenure of a congressman is 6.7 years. I've been here twenty years, my friend has been here twenty-four years, and we're going to be here long after you're gone, young man." Then he walked away. And as it turned out, he was right. About a year later, I was gone and he was still there.

But that was an effort by the State Department to help finance the United Nations.

Sharp: We really do know so little about the workings of Californians in Congress that we get these vignettes, anecdotes, wherever we can and piece together interesting information. Ed Gillenwaters* was very good on Bob Wilson and some of the things that he had done.

*Edgar Gillenwaters, "Washington Office Troubleshooter and Advocate for Commerce in California, 1967-1973," an oral history interview conducted in 1983, Internal and External Operations of the California Governor's Office, 1966-1974, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1985.

II CALIFORNIA'S LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR, 1969-1974

The Appointment and Transition to the Office; A Note on the Energy Planning Council

Sharp: Let's move on to your becoming lieutenant governor. And your story is a little brief--maybe I can get you to stretch it out a bit. But in a California Journal issue, there was an interview with you that was done shortly after you came in.* You went through just a portion of the appointment process as you had recalled at that time. You mentioned to four different people that you were interested in the job.

Reinecke: Yes, that's right. What I did was this: When I heard my name was being considered, I thought, "Gee, it's not right for the governor: should he choose me, he should know whether I would accept or not. It would be embarrassing for him to offer it and be turned down." Cause I'm sort of a maverick and I don't necessarily go along with it; just because it looks like a bigger, fancier, rosier job, that doesn't mean anything to me. So I thought I better let a couple people know that if he wanted--if he offered it, that I would accept it, but I didn't want it. "I'm not asking for it, but I'll take it if he wants it."

So I told Gillenwaters who was then running the governor's office in Washington, and I told John Canaday who then worked for Lockheed, and I think I told--Was it Rus Walton? I'm not sure. I don't remember right now.

Sharp: He thought it might have been Bill [William P.] Clark.

*"Lt. Governor Ed Reinecke," California Journal, January 1971, pp. 6-7.

Reinecke: No. I met Bill the first day I came out here as lieutenant governor. There were three or four: John Canaday and his partner, Bill Willson (both of them in Lockheed), and Gillenwaters. That's all I can think of right now. But anyway, that was it. I gave them instructions, first of all, not to call Reagan, not to lobby in my behalf, because I was very happy where I was in Congress. But that if he should make that decision, then, that yes, I would be willing to accept. And that was it. Then I sat back and did my thing and nothing happened for several weeks. All of a sudden, I got that phone call that I mentioned. And that was it.

Sharp: Was Mr. Gillenwaters working on your behalf at all?

Reinecke: I don't think so. He was strictly back there representing the governor. But he and I had gotten to know each other, I guess, because he called on all the congressional offices. And we were friends, I think, at that point, and we'd see each other at various political functions and cocktail parties and so forth. So we were friends, but we weren't going out together with our wives or anything like that. It was just an acquaintance type thing. But nobody was working for me that I know of, and I hoped they weren't, because I didn't want it that bad.

Sharp: Did you know who the competition was?

Reinecke: I didn't. At that time, no, I did not know. All I did, when I heard about it, I said, "Well, what is the job?" because I didn't know a thing. I had not come through the state legislature, so, in fact, the only time I'd been to Sacramento was on my way to Medford, Oregon.

So, I did ask somebody out here, I guess my field office, to get a budget of the lieutenant governor's office, just to find out what the responsibilities were. So we had this little one-page thing that said, "You're on the board of regents and the board of trustees of what was then the state colleges, and the State Lands Commission, and such other offices as the governor may appoint"--or something like that. Which wasn't much, and the budget wasn't much. It just looked like a little typical vice-presidential type no-nothing, no-position position.

I thought, maybe, "Well, with Reagan, I think maybe something can happen. Maybe we can build it." And man, we built it to the point that I cried uncle. Because at one point I had thirty-one different responsibilities.

Reinecke: But no, I was not actively seeking it. As I say, I was just really getting my feet on the ground in Congress after two terms, and had done some things that I was pleased with, and had ideas to do more.

Sharp: What recollections do you have of the transition?

Reinecke: Well, when I first came out, [Robert H.] Finch, of course, was going back to Washington as the secretary of HEW [Health, Education and Welfare], so I came out and introduced myself to his office. Bob was not there. I did call Bob and I said, "What kind of a job is this?"

He said, "It's okay."

And I said, "Do you think I should give up a seat in the House to take it?"

He said, "Well--I suppose so."

That was about it, and ho hum, and that was all there was to it. So I never met or sat down with anybody about the thing. I came out here, and Bob tends to be more of a--the moderate arm of the party, and I'm more conservative. So I thought, "Well, he's got his own thing and he was a close friend of Nixon's and so forth," so I thought, "Why don't I just let him and his staff clear out their offices."

So I did, and I went up and I said to his girl--I forget her name now. She passed away not long ago, I think. Anyway, I said, "Look, why don't you just do your thing and wind up all the affairs here as conveniently as you can. I'll ask Reagan to give me an office downstairs in his shop, a desk, because I don't have much to do yet anyway. And let me just start looking for staff and so forth."

So the transition was just a politeness of letting them finish and get the hell out and while I started up in a different office. And after they did move out, I moved in and then set up my own shop.

Sharp: How long did that take when you were actually in the governor's office area?

Reinecke: Oh, two or three weeks. And I would go up and down. It wasn't that I didn't go near them, but I didn't try to involve myself in what they were doing. I let Bob finish his term out as completely as he could so the staff could do whatever they had to do.

Sharp: When did Win Adams* take the part--

Reinecke: Okay. Win Adams had been on the staff of the governor, and I needed an executive assistant. I didn't know beans about state government, so I thought I'd better get somebody around that knows what's going on.

That was the one thing I did right when I went to Congress. Most guys take all their people from home. I didn't take anybody from home. I said, "Now I got to go back there and get somebody that's got some smarts." So I hired a local staff, and they were great. They supported me while I learned. And so I figured the same thing would work here. And Win was very good at that. He was with me for about--oh, gosh, I don't think it was more than about six to nine months. But he helped set up the office, he knew the functions well, and we got things going. Then I did hire someone else after that.

Sharp: I guess there were a few notes that maybe the transition period when you were working with Win Adams wasn't all that it might have been.

Reinecke: Well, Win and I always got along. What I didn't know until later was that Win was not in that great of favor in the governor's office, and so a lot of the things that I thought were happening weren't happening because he didn't have the credibility downstairs that I thought he did. But I didn't know that until he was gone. So no, we got along fine. I'm in the fortunate position of having almost no fights with anybody. The only people who have called me bad names have just been in recent months across the street here since I've been taking some shots at Willie [L.] Brown [Jr.] and some of the people. But I've gotten along very well with everybody, politically.

You asked the other question, did I know who was running--who my competition was. No. But I did find out later that there was quite a string. And therein lay a story that I should have known. It's like winning a beauty contest: Only one person wins and the others are all envious of that person. And it turned out that a lot of those people were people in Reagan's cabinet or in his office, and so I had some built-in problems that I didn't anticipate. And for that reason--

*Winfred Adams, "Strategies for Republican Elections, State Government Management, and Water Resources, 1963-1976," an oral history interview conducted 1981-1982, Appointments, Cabinet Management, and Policy Research for Governor Ronald Reagan, 1967-1974, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California. Berkeley, 1983.

Sharp: --because you won and they didn't.

Reinecke: Yes, that's right. Not for any personality things. I never had an argument with any of them, but I finally realized why they just froze me out on so many things. I did not have that good of a relationship with the governor's office. Reagan and I were just one-to-one perfect. We had a separate little red telephone if we wanted to talk to each other, we'd buzz back and forth. No problem whatsoever. But the official family, it was something else down there. It just wasn't that good. Frank Walton and Jim Stearns (Secretaries of Agriculture) were two exceptions and wonderful friends.

Sharp: You know, I'd really like to get into that later in this session and then when we meet in July because it has, I would think, important implications for policy making--whether in the lieutenant governor's office or cabinet meetings or--

Reinecke: True, and we can expand on that when you want to get to it. For instance, one little example right now. Energy was always an important thing to me back in the sixties before we had problems. So I brought a cabinet memo, as we used to call them, to the cabinet saying, "We've got to look at our energy situation. What are our resources and what's our consumption. And do we balance or what's our projection for the future, cause you can't change these things overnight."

They kind of laughed at it and finally, just because the governor was willing to allow me some--a plaything, they said, "Give him a toy," type thing, he said, "Go ahead."

So we set up an Energy Planning Council, I guess we called it.* And it got funded by the National Science Foundation because we had no state funds for it, but I went back to Washington and got some. We put on an energy conference out here at the airport. A two-day conference, Edward Teller was our principal speaker and I forget who else was there. But we had the environmentalists, we had the energy producers of all sorts, we had lawyers, we had--we had everybody--government and so forth. And out of that two-day conference, we came up with a very significant memo on energy problems that sure enough, the lines of supply and consumption were going to cross.

*See "Who Does What in the Energy Crisis," by Maureen Fitzgerald, California Journal, December 1973, p. 407.

Reinecke: We published this thing and we had all sorts of conservation measures and new production measures and so forth. And all this took place and we published the thing about six months before the oil embargo back in '73, before the clutch really hit. So it wasn't until after that that they finally said, "Geez, I guess energy's your bag, Ed."

But I'll never forget when I first introduced that thing, one of his men who was very high level said, "You mean we can't use our electric toothbrushes any more?" That was the perception. And it still is the perception in many offices because so many guys are either just staff-oriented or they're law-school types. There's very little technical involvement.

They just couldn't perceive that there was ever a problem with energy. Every time you open the faucet, the water comes out; every time you turn on the gas, gas comes out, and so forth.

Sharp: And the lights go on.

Reinecke: And the lights go on, right. So they never could conceive that this was ever going to be a problem. Anyway, they saw it as a problem with electric toothbrushes rather than a problem of massive national deficits, balance of trade problems, and things of that nature.

Sharp: The oil embargo was what helped to catapult Charles Warren into his prominence.

Reinecke: That's right. Charlie Warren was the chairman of the Environmental-something-or-other committee here, and he went to Washington as chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality, I think it was.* And did, I think, a reasonably good job.

Sharp: But when he was in the assembly, some of the energy conservation bills that he was putting through were pretty much independent of your efforts.

Reinecke: Oh, yes. They had nothing to do with me. No, Charlie deserves all the credit for everything he did, and he did a good job.

*While in the California assembly, Warren chaired two committees which considered energy issues: Resources, Energy and Land Use; and, Energy and Diminishing Materials. See his interview in this same series, "From the California Assembly to the Council on Environmental Quality, 1962-1979: The Evolution of an Environmentalist," in process, Regional Oral History Office.

Sharp: Is there some particular reason why you were acting independently of Mr. Warren?

Reinecke: The lieutenant governor is always independent of everybody because he doesn't amount to anything in anybody's bag. The governor's staff looks at the lieutenant governor, I think, as a necessary evil. The lieutenant governor is the president of the senate, but seldom presides and is always a stranger when he comes to court, so to speak. The assembly just ignores him. He's just a fifth wheel, that's all. And it doesn't matter whether he's Republican or Democrat--he's just scar tissue.

Sharp: Well, we'll get around to some of the other issues and then we'll come back to this theme.

What of Mr. Finch's programs were left over when you came in?

Reinecke: Only those that were statutorily there: regents, trustees, state lands, president of the senate. Period. I don't know what Bob was doing. We never talked that much. We knew each other well, but we were never really close friends, I wouldn't say. Good friends, but not, you know, it wasn't the discussion type thing. He obviously got himself in a beehive when he walked into the HEW back in Washington. So he didn't have any time for that stuff. My whole job shifted. I don't think Bob and Reagan were that close. The stories I heard, and this is third-hand, were that there were some frictions there. I don't know why--I think it was mostly staff.

So there wasn't that much going on. Bob Finch was basically running a political office, I was told. When I heard that, that's the reason I said, "Look, you guys finish your job and clear out, and I'll start over."

So then the governor got in with me, got into all these various things that are listed in the data that you gave me. And I wound up with thirty-one different responsibilities. We tried to make a pretty significant office out of it. Most of it was on very, very little budget, but it worked fairly well.

Sharp: When you came in, was there some point where the expectations that the governor had of you were made obvious? Did someone sit down with you at some particular point and say, "These are going to be your particular projects"?

Reinecke: No, Reagan just said, "Ed, take it and do what you want with it." In fact, the first morning I came up here--

Reinecke: He appointed me on a Tuesday night (that would have been my birthday). I said, "Fine. When do you want me out there?"

He said, "How about Thursday morning?" So I had to fly on Wednesday to LA, and there was a reception for me there and then I came up here to Sacramento. It was a foggy day and I had to land in Oakland and come in by CHP [California Highway Patrol]. It was one of those--days where everything that could go wrong, did, you know?

So instead of having a briefing period--they had set aside a half hour for Reagan and I to get to know each other a little bit--I walked in and I remember it was Ed [Edwin] Meese [III]. We sat down for probably three or four minutes.

Meese said, "Governor, the press has been waiting for an hour and a half in the press room." So we both got up and walked out.

One of the first questions the press asked me was, "What do you think of--" What the heck was it that he called it? Something like "the free society" or "the free--." A word I'd never heard before, and obviously I don't even remember it now, having to do with free enterprise type of thing. A concept that Reagan had labeled. And I had never even read it, because I didn't even bother reading Sacramento papers--

Sharp: "The free society"?

Reinecke: That's not the right word, but it's something like that. What did Reagan call himself, the something--

Sharp: "The creative society"?

Reinecke: Yes. But the press asked me. And I didn't have the slightest idea what they were talking about. So I winged it. As it turned out, it came off awfully close to what Reagan had been talking about. And he was thrilled with that.

As a matter of fact, afterwards, the day I came in was the day that Bill Clark left. He had been Reagan's executive assistant and he had just been appointed judge in the superior court in San Luis Obispo. So I met with Bill for ten or fifteen minutes, I guess, in his office.

Reinecke: He said, "I was very anxious about this whole thing, Ed." He said, "You and I have never met, but after just watching you handle 'creative society'--that's what it was--and I winged it and fortunately it all fell together. "After watching you in that press conference," he said, "I don't have any problems. I think I can go to San Luis Obispo and be comfortable. You and Ron are going to get along just fine."

So that was it. Reagan never put--in fact I asked him when he called me in Washington, I said, "What do you expect of me? What am I to do? Where do I stand?"

He said, "Whatever you want to do." He said, "What do you want to do?"

I said, "Well, I'd like to be lieutenant governor until such time as you're no longer governor and then I'd like to take a shot at the governor."

He said, "That's fine. You've got the job."

And that was it. That's virtually the whole conversation between us. There were no conditions, no qualifications of any kind.

Sharp: Was there a point--during the transition, or maybe after you felt the transition was over--where you just sat at your desk and thought to yourself, gee, I wish I were somewhere else?

Reinecke: Oh, you do that all the time in politics. Like right now. I don't mean interviewing with you, but there are frustrations in politics at any level that well up and subside. I don't recall--I did get frustrated when I was trying to work with Reagan's staff and I realized that I was being cut off at the pass every time. That was--I was very resentful of that.

But I knew that being in Washington as a member of the House, was a great job, and I loved it, and I really think it was the best political job I ever had. I mean, it was better than being lieutenant governor because I was a freeswinging independent--I'm kind of a free spirit, so I liked that because I was strictly my own boss. And I was the top of the stack. But I also knew that you'd never go very far in the House. I mean, you're pigeonholed. And after the first few months there, I said, "If you stay here more than six or eight years, you might as well retire here." That's what most guys do. (Guys and gals.)

Reinecke: So I saw this as an opportunity, and so I did use it. I worked very hard at all these things, and I moved up and down the state like crazy, almost independently of the governor's office. In fact, frequently independently and sometimes not necessarily in agreement, to establish myself, to establish programs that I thought were right, that I would like to start building a precedent for a period as governor.

That's what I was really doing. I was on the Coastal Commission thing and the Commission of the Californias with all the Hispanics and so forth. And the science--the Office of Science and Technology. They never had that until I came along. The drug abuse program which just turned some of the governor's people inside out, but we did an awful lot with it. You know, we did a lot of things like that. And I went to regents' meetings, but I'd also go to, like, I went to Isla Vista (near UC Santa Barbara) one time and snuck in the back door and sat in one of their city council meetings. This was when all the trouble--right after the Bank of America had been bombed or burned or whatever.

I'm sort of oriented from the bottom up instead of from the top down. I like the people's approach to things. I'm a populist type of guy, I guess you'd say. And I resent the imperialistic approach of many levels--whether it's Congress or ~~senate~~ or assembly or the governor or the presidency. Their heads get awful damn big when they get in those slots. That bothers me, cause I'm the one who's always out shaking hands and walking the streets talking to people instead of talking to the heavies. That's also why I'm here as chairman of the California Republican party and not over there as governor, too.

Sharp: You know, there are some criticisms of Reagan's governor's office, that there was somewhat of a messianic feeling.

Reinecke: No question about it.

Sharp: That the staff reinforced.

Reinecke: Oh, we used to call it "The Palace Guard" and it's there now, it's still in Washington--the same guys--Meese and [Michael K.] Deaver, primarily. Clark was never part of it (Bill is a very, very different individual), but Ed Meese did it just on a technical functional basis, Deaver handled sort of the political side, and he still is, somewhat. But they're just protective. They're just guys who have total blinders and loyalty to the president, and I can't fault that except at some point that's not necessarily in the best interest of the president--or the governor or whoever.

Reinecke: I mean, you know, if I had somebody out here who was keeping me away from other people, it wouldn't fly. They wouldn't be here very long because I don't think anyone in any office of authority should be exclusive. I think he should be inclusive.

So I've always had so-called open-door policies, and I've always gone out and run through the barrios and the ghettos and the whatever to get the people's feeling and the people's reaction.

But as I say, politically, it's not the way to be elected, unfortunately.

Sharp: You mentioned that you had a better relationship with Mr. Reagan than you did with his staff. I know that Mr. Finch met with Reagan on a weekly basis to talk about legislation, primarily, and strategy for what might be supported and what shouldn't be supported. I wondered if you were able to continue this when you came in.

Reinecke: Well, I met with Reagan many times--numerous times each week. He put me on his governor's council, which was window dressing. That was a big group. But I was also on his cabinet. So we sat shoulder to shoulder for six years discussing every bit of management and every subject that ever came up. So he and I were always together.

I think they met a minimum of two days a week, frequently three times a week for two- or three-hour sessions. I was also in on his appointment sessions where we would evaluate--you know, the staff would give him three or four candidates, and he would pick one or two or whatever it was.

So, Ron and I became very close and I would say my relationships with him, from what I hear, were much better than Finch's. Just because we were totally compatible philosophically, first of all. Reagan is a very honest guy. He really feels very strongly about his philosophy, and all the pomp and circumstance and BS that goes on around him is necessary because of the office.

But when you get down to it, that's why he and Bill Clark are so very close. Theirs are clean, neat minds that really are in lock step philosophically. I think he and I were, also, and that's why we're still friends.

Sharp: I want to ask you about some of these responsibilities, but I don't want to lose the topic of your participation in the cabinet, because it's something I haven't really gotten with anybody else. So maybe we could talk about your role in the cabinet based on your activity in some of these councils.

Expanded Responsibilities and Activities of the Office: Role
in the Governor's Cabinet##

Office of Planning and Research

- Sharp: There are some noticeable changes in the lieutenant governor's office after you came in in '70. One of them is the Office of Planning. And I don't know if this chronology is right at all, but my understanding is that Mr. Reagan brought the Office of Planning into the lieutenant governor's office under Samuel Cullers.
- Reinecke: Cullers. Sam Cullers. That was while Finch was here. In fact, I was under the impression that the State Office of Planning started about '64, and then, I guess, was assigned to the lieutenant governor's office and Finch picked it up, and then I didn't get it until I came in in the early part of '69.
- Sharp: As far as these roster notes show, it was July of '70.
- Reinecke: Oh, no. Because it was phased out by then, I think.
- Sharp: Well, not quite, because the California Environmental Quality Act was passed in '70. Along with that, the Office of Planning and Research was passed as AB 2070, but that's later in the seventies.
- Reinecke: That's right. And that basically took the functions of State Office of Planning.
- Sharp: Right.
- Reinecke: So that's why I say that's when it phased out. Well, it shifted gears from the SOP [State Office of Planning] to the Office of Planning and Research [OPR].*
- Sharp: Then it was a much beefed-up operation in the sense of what was written into the descriptions--the creation of the office would mean much more environmental planning.
- Reinecke: Yes. Well, the period of the sixties was when planning suddenly got its recognition. So the State Office of Planning was sort of a first attempt at maybe the state should look for early warning things, and plan for this and plan for that. And I think it was a good effort.

*See "New State Planning Office Charts Course Through Troubled Waters," California Journal, November 1970, p. 315.

Reinecke: Sam Cullers, who is still around here and still active in Sacramento if you want to talk to him, could give you a lot of detail on that, because he feels like he sort of got trampled on. He's a delightful guy and was a good planner.

But anyway, planning just wasn't at the degree of sophistication and, also, didn't have the budget. When Office of Planning and Research came along, they took it out of the--well, it was in the lieutenant governor's office, it was just a supervisory responsibility. It wasn't in the office as such, it was some other building. But I sort of had to oversee it.

When it became OPR, then it came into the corner office and became, as you say, beefed-up, from the budget point of view, so they could put more personnel on and they started to work.

Sharp: I understood that there was, perhaps, some disagreement about the kind of planning that the new Office of Planning and Research should do. In other words, that the administration was somewhat less interested in the environmental planning.

Reinecke: I think that's a fair statement, yes.

Sharp: John Tooker was the man who came in and he was there--just about matches your time from '71 through '73.

Reinecke: That's right, and Tooker's still around. I just saw him just last week. But you're correct. It became, I'd have to say, almost another legislation office oriented towards the environment. In other words, they worked on environmental programs, they did put on some environmental councils and things like that that I was involved in, but that was not the big issue at the time. And it was pro-environment. It was not anti-environment, as it has been frequently characterized, but they weren't going out of their way looking for it. Tooker did what he thought was reasonable and right, but his staff was not oriented sympathetically towards the environmentalists.

Sharp: Was this something that you got involved in, once it became the Office of--

Reinecke: No, I was clear on the outside of that. I just lost it all. And it was no big bang on me either. The planning, as I say, was still in the early enough concept at that point that it wasn't that much and I didn't care cause we didn't have anything going.

Office of Intergovernmental Management and its Councils

Sharp: I thought we might talk about the Council on Intergovernmental Relations. I wanted to give you the list of who all was on it. [hands interviewee list of members] Up at the top. Right there.

Who were those people? Why were they on it?

Reinecke: Okay, they were chosen--appointed by the governor. Ross Barrett is the chairman of Metromedia, in LA. Wonderful guy. Paul Anderson was a magnificent--. I think the law that set this up called for so many from private sector, so many from local government, because it was an intergovernmental thing. Paul Anderson, who is now dead, was a supervisor in Riverside. Chuck [Charles] Bacigalupi, I never knew that well. Dave [David L.] Baker was a supervisor from Santa Ana. [James V.] Fitzgerald was a supervisor from San Bruno. Hugh [Houston I.] Flournoy was here as the state controller. Ruth Green, I think she was just a community-oriented lady from San Diego. Jim [James M.] Hall, at that time, I don't think he was Business and Transportation secretary, but he might have been. Maurice Hamilton, I don't remember. Jim [James C.] Haugh was a lawyer, I believe in San Diego. Ike Livermore was a member of the cabinet--Norm [Norman B.] Livermore [Jr.], that is. Wes [Wesley] McClure, I don't remember. Verne Orr was either the director of the Department of Motor Vehicles or director of Finance for the state. I'm not sure of the dates there. Myself. Lucian Vandegrift was Health and Welfare.

Bill [William L.C.] Wheaton was the only guy I had trouble with. He was the dean of the College of Environmental Design at [University of California at] Berkeley. It was in his shop. (I went over and sneaked in the back door and sat in a few of his classes and things like that. I was always doing that type of thing.) This is where all the T-shirts and all the signs for all the anti-Vietnam efforts were being made--in his college. T-shirts and signs and all kinds of stuff. He was a "flaming lib."

Howard [H.] Wiefels was the mayor of Palm Springs. [W.] Odie Wright was the mayor of Long Beach. Frank Fargo--I don't know where he came from, but I got rid of him, and replaced him with Ron [Ronald B.] Frankum who did a good job.

Sharp: What were the interests of this group on the council? Do you recall?

Reinecke: It was sort of a cross-wiring of all the interests of school boards, local governments, city government, county government-- city, county, and school board government along with the state. It was just trying to resolve some of the issues and some of the differences that usually came down to the establishment of special districts, for instance, legislation requiring--because the districts were growing, you know, proliferating tremendously. I don't know where they are now but they were well over four thousand back then, state-wide.

And the funding of them and the taxation problems as it related to the authority of mostly city and county government.

The Council on Intergovernmental Relations was a very conscientious group. The council's one of the more impressive of all the groups that I had because it's kind of one of those things where you can talk forever and never do anything. But they did do something and they accomplished a great deal. Ross Barrett was a fantastic chairman.

Sharp: What were some of the proposals that they--

Reinecke: Oh, they lobbied and took positions on legislation that affected local government. I think SB 90 came out of this group. That was a bill that said that any time the state legislature or the state government imposes a responsibility on local government, it should also send the money along with it. So, if we tell you to pick up old dogs or regulate all fireworks, we should also fund it. And that type of thing they were looking at. I don't have any firm recollection. We went beyond that, I know, in lots of things. But we worked with the County Supervisors' Association and the City-- What do you call the Cities?

Sharp: The League of Cities--

Reinecke: The League of California Cities, right. We worked very closely with them on all their programs. They were mostly interested in funding.

That's what government's all about is where to get the bucks the easiest.

Sharp: I want to ask you about the Department of Commerce and its revival. But before I do that, are there some of the other activities besides the Council on Intergovernmental Relations that you might have been interested in?

Reinecke: Under that whole--What did we call it?--Office of Intergovernmental Management, the council was just one part. Included, well, there was the Environmental Quality Study Council which did its good job but then sort of phased out, and out of that pretty much came the CEQA [California Environmental Quality Act] in compatibility with the NEPA [National Environmental Protection Agency].

The IBDP--the Intergovernmental Board of Data Processing--was the first attempt ever to make it so that cities and counties and school boards could talk to one another on computers, because everybody had their own format and their own type equipment and the programs, and nobody knew anybody. So we were trying to get uniform concepts down. And I think there was at least recognition of the problem. I won't say that any giant strides--.

Office of Intergovernmental Management, that's what I called it. That oversaw all of these things. That's where Ron Frankum was, which included the Office of Management Services. This is an extremely important thing. Bob Finch started it as a result of legislation, it was in his office, to try to do the same thing I just mentioned on the intergovernmental level at the state level. In fact, we reduced the number of data processing centers from something like sixty-five to thirty-five in a matter of three or four years.

Charlie [Charles P.] Smith, a Ph.D. and a very competent man--really, he was too good for state government--came up with an overall plan. This was unfortunately a question of turf problems. One day I got a call about fifteen minutes to twelve. The Budget Conference Committee was about to come out, and they said, "Ed, they just un-funded Charlie Smith's position."

And they did. Instead of firing him, they just took away his salary. Subsequently, the entire office just vanished.

This was in the time we were having a fight with a big computer which still isn't working--What the hell is the big one--the big center we've got now? It was named after the senator from up here in Railroad Flats.

Sharp: Teale--

Reinecke: Yes, the [Stephen P.] Teale [Consolidated Data] Center. Thank you. That was a little hanky-pank, I think, in the governor's office in the Department of General Services. They wrote a set of specifications that only IBM could fill. I mean, they were right

Reinecke: down to the color of the frames and that kind of stuff. I fought that, cause I wanted the thing to be open and anyone who was competent could bid it. Charlie Smith felt that way too.

The Palace Guard

Reinecke: I'll never forget one [interruption]--story. This is an example, also, of the relation of "The Place Guard" problem. It had to do with this Office of Management Services. After working for three or four years, they came up with a plan, a master plan for the state of California of compatibility of data processing, consolidation security, programming, and language. It was coming before the cabinet, and it was my obligation, of course, to present the issue and to argue it.

I wanted Reagan to see it beforehand, because it was too much to swallow in one first showing. And here was a book about so thick [gestures several inches]. I had it wrapped in brown paper or something else, sealed, "Governor's Eyes Only." Instead of just putting it in the mail, I took it down there and handed it to Helene von Damm who was then his secretary.

I said "Helene, this is something--" Cause Reagan always used to do his homework. He'd take all kinds of stuff home and he'd sit there and leaf through it at home so he'd be prepared for the next day. Well, this was about a week ahead of time. I said, "This is a big item."

There were summaries and all that kind of stuff in there so he didn't have to read the whole thing, but he did have to read about ten pages to know what it was.

I said, "It's very crucial when this comes before the cabinet that the governor have some insight as to what this question is, because it's a heavy question, it's an expensive one." So I said, "Please be sure that he sees this."

Because, you know, it was "Governor's Eyes Only--Personal--Confidential--From the Lieutenant Governor to the Governor" and all that kind of stuff.

So a week or so later, the issue came up and I'm sitting there at the cabinet, reading, and I said, "Governor, I presume you've had a chance to read that."

Reinecke: He said, "What book?"

I looked down at the end of the table and here was Ed Meese thumbing through the book. It never got to Reagan. That just really turned me off--that even Helene, who I thought was there looking for the best interest of Reagan, obviously had her marching orders from Ed Meese. That 'Don't give anything to him unless I see it first,' that takes place across there in the governor's office even today. It's unfortunate.

But I guess that's the way those offices are set up. I would never have done it that way had I been in that spot, but I probably would have been hassled to death by thousands of people.

Anyway, as a result of that, they--Verne Orr, who was involved in General Services also, or had been before he was in Finance--came in with a substitute motion. A little one-page memo of how to solve the EDPB [Electronic Data Processing Board] problems of this state. They substituted it and I lost and then, of course, subsequently, I lost Charlie and the whole bunch. To me, it was a serious defeat. Not for me personally--I didn't give a darn one way or the other about that. But here were people, very competent, capable people who had done an excellent job. Even if they had wanted to debate it and change it, it could have been done. But to just chuck the whole thing in the waste basket was an unfortunate, exemplary example of how the inside "Palace Guard" works.

Sharp: I don't understand why Mr. Reagan wouldn't have put a lid on this kind of thing.

Reinecke: Well, I never understood that either, to be very honest with you. Cause this type of thing happened more than a few times. Either he was kept totally unaware of it, or else, he just accepted, you know, Ed Meese or whoever's advice contrary to everybody else.

Sharp: Because it made things run more smoothly, or--?

Reinecke: Well, I think it did that in terms of office flow. At one point, I remember--this is not very complimentary--but Reagan joked about the fact that we only let him know what we wanted him to know. And how, I remember he said, at one time they used to send him out to see movies in the afternoon. And in fact, he did go to movies once in a while in the afternoon. He'd go through the basement and they'd take him out to some movie he wanted to see. He's big on movies--he still is. That's why he and Nancy sit there eating their dinner off TV trays--because they want to watch the box. But he loves it. That's his profession and that's where he is.

Reinecke: But there were times when they should have exposed him to problems such as this instead of some others.

Sharp: What about that alternate plan that Mr. Orr came up with?

Reinecke: Basically, it said, "Let the Department of Finance decide it."

Sharp: So it was a budget matter.

Reinecke: Well, it was a budget matter, but it was also a turf war because this is where IBM--this is where I think--oh, I can't say that anything improper was handled, but the opinions of those in the Department of Finance were such that they wanted to see this IBM equipment. They were sold on IBM and they didn't really want competition. The proposal I had was going to create competition. It was a functional specification as opposed to a design specification. They didn't want that, so they put the whole thing to bed, they put the Teale Center together, and that's where it went.

Anyway, I was just running down the list, OMS. Anything else in this particular--the Office of Planning? That's about it.

Some Accomplishments and Irregularities of the Office

Sharp: All right, we can pick up where we have ended here next time. We can talk about the Department of Commerce.

Reinecke: The Model Cities, which is not shown here, was one of our responsibilities, too. I had the supervision of the Model Cities program for the state.

Sharp: May we talk about that next time then?

Reinecke: Sure. In fact, somewhere, I'll try to find a list--as I said, it came out to be thirty-one different offices and gadgets.*

Sharp: I'd like to see that, cause it's not something that I've seen yet.

*Mr. Reinecke was unable to locate this material.

Reinecke: I don't think it has ever been published. At some point we put together a biography and it had all that stuff in it, and I don't know--I've thrown most of that stuff away. I'm not a historian, I'm sorry to say.

Sharp: Well, some of us around are, so--.

Reinecke: I'm glad, cause if you left it to me, we wouldn't know what happened last year anywhere in the world.

Sharp: Along that same line, I have wanted to do additional research in what's left of you in paper form, and I made a couple of phone calls to the Hoover. Molly Tuthill is there--Molly Sturges Tuthill. There isn't very much within the Reagan gubernatorial papers that are yours--

Reinecke: No. I'm not aware that anything went over there.

Sharp: Did it go somewhere else?

Reinecke: When I left office, I was advised that anything in it that wasn't personal or political should go to the State Archives. So boxes and boxes and boxes of stuff went to State Archives. But then one day (I lived in Placerville) all of a sudden I got a call from a workshop--a rehabilitation workshop man--and I happened to know him because Placerville is a small town.

He said, "Ed, I've got a picture of you down here. I wonder if you want it."

I said, "What kind of a picture do you got of me?"

So I was going downtown and I stopped by and here was--he showed me this monstrous pile of boxes that his kids were sorting out for manufacture of pulp paper. It was all from the office of the State Archives.

I said, "Where in the world did you get these?"

He said, "They called us and asked us to come and pick it up to make pulp--to recycle the paper." And he happened to pick up this photograph, or two or three photographs. Interestingly, it was Ed Gillenwaters and myself standing in front of the B-1.

I said, "Boy, there's three losers!" [laughter] Anyway, I've still got that photograph someplace.

Reinecke: So I called the state office. I said, "When you decide to dump a lot of your archive material, don't you at least give the principal involved the opportunity to go down and take a look?"

They said, "Gosh, I guess we should, shouldn't we?"
And that was it.

To the extent that I know, and I never bothered to check beyond that--but most of the stuff that went to the archives, was turned over to a recycled paper outfit. That's kind of a shock, I think, from a policy point of view. I don't think that's a stated public policy, but that's what happened.

Sharp: Is it because you left office the way you did?

Reinecke: I don't think so. Those people aren't, I don't think, politically oriented. I think they just needed room. They didn't have space. That's what this guy told me that I was talking about. And I don't know who he was. I mean, he wasn't a friend or anything like that.

But it's kind of sad that--there was a lot of good work done, and done on very, very minimal budgets, cause all these things you're talking about here are operating almost without budget. But I don't think there is very much written.

Sharp: Well, then I'm glad we're meeting.

Reinecke: I'm glad we are, too. Cause as I say, I've junked most of my stuff--in fact, it's funny: One day, I lived on a ranch, and I had barns full of stuff, and all kinds of boxes and boxes and boxes, and I had a great secretary that was wonderful about this sort of thing. I decided I was going to move, and I wasn't going to move all this stuff. So I filled my truck--oh about four or five truck loads, a small, pick up truck with these boxes--and I went to the dump.

And just as a means of sorting, I'd look at them, and if it was scheduling, it would go. If it was something else--. One day I was thumbing through, and here--I picked up a photograph--an autographed photograph of one of the astronauts to me; I got a letter from, I think it was [Richard M.] Nixon; and all this stuff I was about ready to throw in the dump. And I did throw most of it, so I'm sure--I think I brought that one box home. What was in the rest of it, I really don't know. But as I say, I'm not a very good historian.

Reinecke: I'm awfully sorry, because I now regret that I was so ruthless. I just needed space at the time.

Sharp: Well, I'll try to ask you as many questions as I can to reconstruct. Next time, I thought we would talk about the Model Cities program and a little on reapportionment.

Reinecke: Fine. I was on that, too, you know. Reapportionment Commission that got blown out of the water.

Sharp: And your 1970 campaign. I know that you very lightly went over the aspect of the lieutenant governorship, that being your role in the senate. But I was wondering--there are some important bills that you signed in the governor's absence. Then talk about the Department of Commerce, the space shuttle, and all of that.

Reinecke: The bicentennial was a big effort, I mean, a great deal of time spent on it; and the space shuttle thing. Those were both in conjunction with the State Chamber of Commerce. And they worked very well and both were very successful. The Commission of California was a major area of concern, and you're familiar with that one, I guess. That Drug Abuse Task Force that I put together, I thought, was very good and we did an awful lot of good with it.

Sharp: Was that with Mr. [Vernon J.] Cristina or--

Reinecke: Was Vern on that? I don't think so.

Sharp: Well, he mentioned to me a meeting that he and his son--

Reinecke: At Chrysalis House--yes, there was something. You're right.

Yes, I used to go around to all these half-way houses. That was something else that tore the guys up across the street, because no public official is supposed to walk into one of those things, according to their standards. But I enjoyed it very much and that's sort of where you really learn where the world is. At least from my point of view.

Yes, I was the first one to get that computer system set up at the border down there in Tijuana or in San Ysidro. We borrowed-- I talked to the Pacific Telephone. They loaned us the lines. I found over in DMV some spare space on a computer up here, and then we worked with the county and the feds in San Diego. We put the whole thing together.

Reinecke: Oh, the federal government loaned us the terminals that were in the little booths out there, and so for absolute zero budget, just a lot of persuasion, we put the first system together to check license plates and so forth.

Because they have a pretty extensive informant system in Tijuana. When somebody goes there and buys a joint, it gets phoned across and they give them the car and all of a sudden they've got on the license plate. That's why now when you drive through, they type in your license number and whatever they have pops up.

So we did that and the border boys were very, very happy with me because once it was shown (that was just a little demonstration project), within a matter of months, there was funding out of Washington to set the whole damn thing up and build a special building, and of course it took the government \$5 million to do what we did with a few phone calls. But we proved the point, and also the Mexicans liked it because it helped develop a better relationship. There was a time when I had better access to the Los Pinos--the White House in Mexico City--than I did to the White House in Washington, as a matter of fact.

I met with [Luis] Echeverría, I met with Lopez Portillo. Governor Roberto de la Madrid was a very close friend. So I had a lot of good entree down there. In fact, they used to joke that if I didn't run for governor in California, come on down to Baja.

But even there, I went to union meetings in Mexico. I don't speak a word of Spanish and I can't even understand most of it. But I like to be out with the people--the volunteers and so forth. So that's my brand of politics, that's all.

Sharp: It's pretty different from--

Reinecke: Very.

Sharp: Mr. Reagan's and the governor's office and the people who were with him.

Reinecke: That's right. But that's why I fell out of favor with a lot of them, too. They don't buy that kind of stuff. They think this imperialistic approach is what's proper and apparently he likes it. I don't. Philosophically, that's not where government is.

Sharp: Are you a misplaced Democrat, then?

Reinecke: I don't think so, no. Because I think the Democrats are even worse in this regard except that they do a better job of control. The Republicans talk about being more for the people, but in fact, there's damn little difference. There is a difference to me, so lots of times, I am a maverick. Not a Democrat--if anything, I'd be a maverick off in the direction of the American Independent Party or something like that. I don't know where I belong. I'm just kind of a free spirit. As I say, that's why I got this job instead of being governor. But I'm not unhappy about it.

Progress of the Model Cities Program, 1971-1973##

[Interview 2: July 12, 1984]

Sharp: I thought we might start by talking about the Model Cities program. You mentioned last time we met that it was important and that you did some work on it.

Reinecke: Okay.

Sharp: Other parts of the report that I sent you talk about the Model Cities program as developing out of the federal Demonstration Cities Act which was passed by Congress in 1966. I wonder, before we get into your work on it in California, if you might remember some discussions when you were in Congress.

Reinecke: I remember just vaguely. If I remember right, it was put forward by Hubert Humphrey and somebody else, but his name stands out. It was thought to be the wildest of all ideas that he was going to build--the concept was that he was going to build I forget how many--fifty or five hundred or something like that--new cities. Sort of out, away from existing cities and build them as "model cities." I think it was basically a misconception. If he ever had that idea, that certainly is not what came out of the Congress.

But I remember it as being the most socialistic concept that Humphrey ever put forward. I mean, that's the way it was talked about in the House of Representatives. And even his fellow Democrats couldn't handle it. It was just--the government was now everything. It was the rawest form or the purest form of socialism that had come out.

Reinecke: So then the thing was voted passed and I don't remember how I voted. I can almost definitely tell you I voted against it, because I just didn't, in general, on any of those types of things. I'm one that wants to return government to the people or to the states or to the local level, and I was the archenemy of the federal government, so to speak. So I'm sure I must have voted against it. That's all I remember of it. Very, very little was said, except that it was another, as I say, socialistic-oriented program and that, therefore, was bad. I wouldn't have remembered the date that it happened, but I do remember the model city concept.

So then I got out there and all of a sudden, I inherit the job, and "I are one," as they say. But by then I was aware that it wasn't building brand new federal cities. It was a better method of delivery of the services and a more effective way. So we did jump into it. Since I inherited the Office of Intergovernmental Management, why that was one of the elements, as I said before.

So we had this fellow, Tom Duffy who was my man in charge of the Model Cities program. And Tom has stayed in that city-oriented type of thing.

It was sort of the beginning of the block grant programs and the revenue sharing programs, and yet nobody knew how to handle them. The cities, of course, all wanted the money--just typical governmental approach to grab as much resources as they could.

We helped them apply for grants and things, but we tried to make them, you know, sort of responsible. Not just money for the sake of money, but money because there was a need.

So we did insist that they demonstrate a need pretty carefully, which wasn't too difficult to do, but it simply had to be couched in the proper language to--in the bureaucratese, as the saying goes--to stimulate those in Washington that would make decisions on authorizing grants.

So that was pretty much the way it was. By then, Nixon was back there, so I was dealing with a Republican administration although I don't think his appointments had reached down into--that far into--HUD (most of this was HUD money--Housing and Urban Development) and I don't think that there was that much influence. I mean, it wasn't a political thing at all. It was still a fairly academic approach to--or not academic--that's too sophisticated for anything in Washington. In other words, they were basing their

Reinecke: grants on some reasonable formulas for budget justification. Showing a cause or a need and then the proper administration, and that's when I really first got acquainted with the budgeteers--those who are capable of developing budgets around anything. I'm still working with them today in the state party, trying to watch, because, you know, if you need a postage stamp, it may cost--

Sharp: They'll make a case for it.

Reinecke: They'll make a case for it and it'll cost you \$20 to get a postage stamp. It's much like the \$500 hammers in the Pentagon type thing. So anyway, that was a problem that we recognized.

And I think that there were only, if I remember right, eleven Model Cities which were established.

Sharp: There were eleven.

Reinecke: Eleven was it, in California? Okay.

We were always finding that they had somebody budgeted in that was really doing something else. He might have been a painter or whatever, but this again is a budgetary exercise of putting unnecessary people on the payroll to get them paid by some other source so that they can do something else with the rest of the city budget. We found a lot of that, and we tried to clean that up so that the budget only listed those people that were necessary to accomplish the objective of the application.

It was a good exercise because I had never dealt with cities or counties before at all, and so, by and large, the people were very conscientious, but, as I say, they were out there to feather their own nests--and work "the system."

Sharp: Your contacts in Washington--you know, the ones from your congressional days--were you able to use that or not in a way that was helpful to--

Reinecke: Very, very little. There were a couple--around Model Cities, no, there was nothing, because I really had no relationship with HUD, and I don't even remember who was secretary of HUD at that time. George Romney, yes, that's right. But he was not from Congress. He was just another one of the political types. For a while he was secretary of HUD. I guess I did make some appeals to him for some of these grants. That's right, I remember sitting in his office.

Anyway, so I guess I did. But as far as congressional contacts, no, I don't recall using any political influence of any kind in that regard.

Sharp: Let me back you up a little bit. One of the goals, at least this excerpt of the report that I saw said that in the Model Cities there would be a concentration of federal and other kinds of resources--delivery of the resources--so that people could really see if the sources were working right and that the federal agencies were doing the best job that they could. Whether or not those agencies were working right and the resources were used accurately--that kind of detailed information, does that come to you?

Reinecke: No. We didn't get any of that. We were not in the business to police the grants. We were simply there to try to help them acquire the grants. I think prior to the Model Cities program, and these block grants and revenue sharing, the money had been handed through the state, probably Housing and Community Development Department or something, down to these levels. And this was a sort of bypassing of the state in some respects. The money went direct--it didn't come through our office or anything like that. Our office was simply there to expedite and to help deliver the system, so to speak. So our work was on the front end going in. We didn't have anything to do with audits, we didn't look at the product afterwards, anything like that.

Sharp: The Kaplan study--that's what this report is--commented on what it called "inadequate state assistance" in the program.* That there wasn't really adequate state commitment to make the whole thing work.

Reinecke: I think that's probably fairly true. It was, you know, fairly new in the Reagan governorship days, and I don't think there was that kind of a commitment. This was sort of a Great Society program that finally matured and was born, and there just was not that commitment. I was given it as a responsibility, along with other things, and I know we were understaffed. Tom Duffy, I mentioned, had a young lady working with him (I forget her name). Then there were some staff people that I don't think I know at all any more. But Duffy was just running all over the state all the time. He did not have sufficient assistance.

Because by the time I got into it, I got sort of conscientious about the thing and thought it was a valid program or at least one that should be tried. I do remember the frustrations of not being

*See the appendix for the "Findings and Recommendations" of this report, "California: Impact of Model Cities and Revenue Sharing Ideas," prepared by Marshall Kaplan, Gans and Kahn for the Office of Intergovernmental Management, in 1973.

Reinecke: able to do what perhaps we should have, but we made the decision not to get involved and try to tell them how to run their programs. but only to help them try to acquire the programs in the first place.

So that was just a quantum decision that had to be made: that we were not going to get involved in following up in any way on the product, as I said, or trying to audit or trying to point out defects or anything else. We just tried to handle the paperwork to get it through as fast as possible.

It was like the state clearing house. That's another function that was in my office that had to do with environmental impact statements. All of those things were technically funnelled through the state clearing house, which was one person. And there were hundreds at times--well, I don't remember the numbers, but many--a great volume of these things. But I do remember that the number was either 44 or 45 copies of every EIR [Environmental Impact Report] that came in.

This person is supposed to look over them, and it got down to a rubber-stamp job where we just automatically passed everything on through, because otherwise we would have been a major log jam. And so, it was again a question of just underfunding, of understaffing, but we could not do any kind of a reasonable job, although I'm not sure there was--well, again, we weren't supposed to be the supercops to look at everything and pass our judgment because who are we to know about the environmental impact on something in some city hundreds of miles away? It was not the right role for us.

So again, we took the perfunctory role of just being the expediter. That's about all they did. So that's probably what you're referring to, and I think they're probably substantially correct.

[brief interruption]

Sharp: Mentioned also in the Kaplan report is AB 3055 which was passed in 1971. A California assembly bill. It was passed, the report said, to try to make things better coordinated, and didn't give too many details about it, but I wondered if it was something you might remember.

Reinecke: Gee, I don't even recall that. Again with reference to Model Cities?

Sharp: Yes. In the report it said that it was an effort to make the Model Cities work better and involve the state in some kind of coordination. Now, I don't know if it's connected or not, but in 1969, two years earlier than this in 1971, there was an executive order to establish a Model Cities liaison group. And it was in your office.

Reinecke: Yes, that's right. That was when I first got into it.

Sharp: A couple years later, this Model Cities liaison group was moved to the Office of Intergovernmental Management [OIM] that was located in the governor's office. So there is this kind of reorganizational restructuring--

Reinecke: That's right, and we had for a long time, we had--it had to do with Housing and Community Development. That was an established department, or maybe that was just established at that point. A lot of these responsibilities were shifted over to the department. Frequently, the governor used the lieutenant governor's office as just sort of a start-up period. As soon as any program would get on its feet and operating, then it would be transferred out to an appropriate department of state government.

This happened over and over again. The drug abuse office that I had--that happened to be my idea, but as soon as we had it going for two or three years, then it became a department by itself. The Office of Economic Development was first a commission idea put together by myself and John Hay of the State Chamber of Commerce. That developed, and the governor accepted it and we got it going, and then it became the Department of Economic Development which still exists today. This happened a number of times. The energy thing that I started up started off that way also.

Because, you see, the office of lieutenant governor has no authority whatsoever to do a damn thing. Very little money. Most of it, an awful lot of it was volunteer. What's why I had to work with other groups such as the State Chamber of Commerce, or California Manufacturers Association, or some veterans' organizations. I remember a job development program that I did for summer jobs for youth. Cause I just didn't have any clout and I don't think the job still has any. It's like vice-president--it's a nothing job.

So lots of these things were just--usually they were nuisances. Nobody in the governor's office wanted to handle them, so they kicked them upstairs to me. That's how I wound up at one point with thirty-one different boards and commissions. In large groups.

- Reinecke: I mean, the OIM included probably eight or ten of those boards and commissions. And so that's what happened to them. As soon as they became organized, they would be passed off, as I say, to an appropriate department, and statutized.
- Sharp: The Office of Housing and Community Development was headed at one point by a man named Charles [R.] LeMenager.
- Reinecke: LeMenager. [correct pronunciation to be l'ma nă'zher] Right. A nice guy.
- Sharp: I believe he was a black appointee, is that correct?
- Reinecke: I don't even remember that. I didn't think--well, I don't remember, really. Chuck LeMenager, yes, he was a fine guy. I don't remember if he was black or not. It didn't even register. I'm sorry.
- Sharp: That's okay. But I wondered about those kinds of appointments. When a new department opened like that, exactly how the appointment process for the head of it might--
- Reinecke: Well, okay. When it was in my office, they were usually just exempt appointments of mine or they were borrowed from some other department of the state or whatever. When they were transferred over to an HCD [Housing and Community Development] or something like that, then it became a formal governor's appointment, and then it went through the normal appointment process in the governor's office. Oh, I would have made recommendations, undoubtedly, but that was all. I didn't have any follow-through from there on.
- Sharp: I didn't have any other questions about the Model Cities program, but I'm wondering if there are some other things, other comments to be made.
- Reinecke: No, I have to admit that I don't think I did a very good job in that area. I think we did what we could, but because of our limitations--basically I only had two people in my office that I had communication with and then there were other general staff types, but it was a very nebulous kind of a thing and it was a new thing. It was starting up.

I do remember going to a number of Model Cities conferences. We held conferences in Sacramento and I think San Francisco and I think I remember one in LA--where the representatives of these

Reinecke: eleven Model Cities would come together and we'd talk about, you know, how do we do things better or how do we communicate better or how do we get whatever. I definitely recall how all these people from the Model Cities worked so hard and were such good conscientious people.

But it was not an easy program because I think your statement earlier was that there was not an open-arms type of acceptance within this administration.

Sharp: That was because it seemed like federal government intrusion?

Reinecke: And it was part of the Great Society type stuff that was just generally offensive.

Sharp: Because it was Democratic, or--

Reinecke: No, I don't think it was a partisan thing. It was just the concept, as I said, of it should be done at the local level. And in effect, that's what this was. That's why I sort of took to it. I liked the idea that it was going to get money in big chunks out of the feds and let the local people handle it. And a lot of these were very good people.

We had a couple of problems, as I remember. A few guys got either investigated or indicted or something, but there was a little misuse as there always is in these social type programs. But, by and large, it worked fairly well, but not with any great gusto.

Sharp: I wasn't here at that time, but I understand from people who were that there was some disagreement at least in the way the Berkeley one was going to run. Disagreement between people who lived in the area who got onto the local Model Cities committee, disagreements about how exactly the program should proceed in the city, and what changes should be made, and how it should be done.

Reinecke: I vaguely remember those things. Not specifically with Berkeley, but in general, it was a start-up period and there were always the mild perturbations of opinions as to how a thing should be administered. Those that have been in a given city for any length of time, usually want to perpetuate the status quo. I mean, that was comfortable, that's where they lived and so forth. The new people were the new bureaucrats coming in, the hucksters of the new wealth, and they wanted to handle it their way--and they were probably the budgeteers that I mentioned before that would like to manipulate it to get some of their friends and things on and make a few bucks on the side for themselves.

Reinecke: This did happen, and I know that there were some problems. As I said, there were some investigations, and I think that's probably what you're referring to.

Task Force on Local Government, 1972

Sharp: Another local government effort was the Task Force on Local Government that was headed by Robert Hawkins.* And you were on it. It was established late '72. You were listed as head of the steering committee for it although the chair was Mr. Hawkins. I wondered what your involvement in it was.

Reinecke: Very, very little. That was sort of a joke. Bob Hawkins is a very, very brilliant young man, but he was basically working out of the governor's office and for the governor's staff, so I had almost nothing to do with it. The only local government task force that I was involved in, I don't remember whether it was under Bob's tutelage or not, but it had to do with local governments' reactions to their proposed, what became, Proposition 20--the Coastal Commission. This was all before the commission was even legislation--before it was an initiative, I should say.

I was concerned. I still had that interest from, I guess, my congressional days of coastline and oceanography, et cetera. So I had a little task force of my own, and Mr. Pete [Peter L.] Tweedt, in my office, headed that for me. We held hearings all up and down the coast trying to figure out how we could--and this all relates also back to the state plan when there was a state Office of Planning--how we could relate state planning functions and how we could or could not impose them on local governments.

My feelings were the state should set certain criteria, environmental type criteria, and the local governments should carry out or implement those criteria. As it turned out, in fact, we had quite a proposal to put through. Senator Pete [Peter B.] Wilson, who was then an assemblyman, was willing to carry the bill for us, but there was a little bit of monkey business within the governor's office that shot my plan down.

*For additional information on this task force, see "Reagan Task-Force Surprise: Special District is the Most Efficient Form of Local Government," by Ed Salzman, in California Journal, January 1974, p. 28, and interview in this series with Robert Hawkins.

Reinecke: My plan was simply that the state office--and I don't remember whether it was the state Office of Planning or some function of the governor's office--would establish fundamental criteria for planning in the coastal area, the coastal zone. Then it would be, once that was adopted, up to the cities and the counties and the harbor districts to implement.

Pete was willing to carry the bill, and had we done it, I think probably we never would have had a Proposition 20 or a Coastal Commission as we know it today. But there were some people in the governor's office that didn't like the idea, and they frankly shot the thing down. So we got nowhere on it. They managed to sandbag it by delaying it until it was too late in the legislative session, and the bill just never got into print.

Sharp: What would have been the differences between Prop. 20, the act that was passed, and what you were--

Reinecke: It would have left the principal authority with the local government level as opposed to the Coastal Commission itself. We were willing to put together a statewide body where it was in the governor's office or whether it would have been--I think it was some sort of a board or commission appointed by the governor and both houses of the legislature, that would establish these fundamental criteria.

But then my concept, being along with what I've said before, was that the local people are the only ones that can really implement that. Otherwise, we're doing the planning for cities and counties, and making them pay the bill for it without any input. So I was very strong in this regard.

And I do remember, as a matter of fact, we were holding meetings with members of the governor's cabinet about the thing.

All of a sudden I learned that the cabinet was having meetings without me on this particular subject at night over at somebody's house, at one of the member's house. In effect, they were bypassing me, which wasn't surprising, or wasn't new, but in this case, I just learned about it too late, unfortunately, and was unable to do anything about it. By then, Wilson just said, "Well, I'm sorry, but the legislative time for introducing bills has gone by."

Sharp: But the members of the governor's office who were working on this particular idea and stopping it from going into the legislature and being introduced, was it because they opposed it or just because it was yours?

Reinecke: Probably a little of each. I'm trying to think of what it was that they--where our basic differences were. I really don't remember it right now.

Sharp: Because they opposed Proposition 20.

Reinecke: Oh, very much so.

I think that they didn't want to do anything. I think that's what it was. They just didn't want any (even state) function establishing even criteria. And I conceived what I thought was coming down the pike was a Prop. 20.

So I said, far better we should preserve the prerogative of local government and at least set up statewide criteria because that's in the interest of all the people of the state, and it is a statewide function. And then let the individual areas carry it out. So that was my sort of a compromise type position, as I say, that would maintain the integrity of local government. But they just said, we just don't want anything. So that's what they got. Then, of course, they got Prop. 20 because of it.

Sharp: Can you be more specific about who in the governor's office was doing this?

Reinecke: I know one of the meetings--the one meeting I can really recall--was over at--he's now secretary of the Air Force--

Sharp: Verne Orr.

Reinecke: Verne Orr's house. Ed Meese was involved. I don't believe Deaver was. What's his name--he was Business and Transportation.

Sharp: Frank Walton?

Reinecke: No, before Frank--

Sharp: Jim Hall.

Reinecke: Thank you. Jim Hall. Geez, you've got all those names right on the tip of your tongue. Jim was involved, and I don't recall any other specifics at that point. But I'm pretty sure of those three. Verne was, I believe, director of Finance at that time and Ed was just always there on behalf of the governor.

Reinecke: Well, I don't know what the governor ever felt about the thing. I never heard that he was even aware of all these things going on.

Sharp: You know, last time, you were telling me that there were occasions when you would put something--give something to Helene von Damm for the governor's attention and only the governor's attention--information that you wanted him to have about stuff you were working on. Is this one of those situations where you might have tried to give some--?

Reinecke: No, I don't recall ever even trying to approach the governor on this particular subject, cause we never brought it to a point of agreement on anything. So it wasn't a completed package, and I wasn't one to go to him crying or complaining. If I couldn't have something to offer him, then I'd just stay in my own area. So I don't believe--I don't think I ever talked to him about this at all.

Sharp: One question about this local government theme: Why is it that there was so much local government attention at this point? There was the Model Cities thing and then this task force that showed that local government was really acting pretty well, and that the governor's idea about streamlining was not necessary, and your idea about commissions, you know, at the local level, deciding what should happen to their part of the coastline. Why all this attention?

Reinecke: I guess I really don't know. It was in the beginning of the environmental days. It was also the beginning of the days when computers--the information age, so to speak.

That's why we developed the Intergovernmental Board on Electronic Data Processing, trying to get common languages and common areas of form so that the cities and counties could talk to one another, and so that what did relate to the state could be shared without massive reprogrammings and so forth--re-inputting.

And I guess that was part of it. The state was becoming more conversant with the cities and the counties. To my knowledge. Now maybe it was happening before and I'm not aware of it, but I became aware that, all of a sudden, we realized that there were cities and counties and special districts out there, and that we could either help them or hurt them. You know, we should take a position one way or the other.

Reinecke: So there was an awful lot of this stuff. In the Environmental Quality Study Council we had that, in the Intergovernmental Board of Electronic Data Processing we had it, in the coastal--the local government survey on the coastal resources--we had it. I was on the State Lands Commission, and there again, we were always involved with local government as it pertained to the management of local lands.

I guess I don't know why. I'm not sure there was a change, but it was a pretty high level, high visibility type of thing. This whole Office of Intergovernmental Management was involved. The Council of Intergovernmental Relations was another function. I don't think that was too old at that point. It might have been that the legislature started all this because there was a local group--that is, the statewide Council of Intergovernmental Relations [CIR]--then there was also a federal thing called the Advisory Council on Intergovernmental Relations. And the governor was on that. He was appointed to it, I guess, by the president or somehow, and then I had the local which was the CIR or the state commission.

I think that it probably comes out of all this Model Cities type of thing, an awareness of urban problems that came to visibility in the late sixties in general, that we hadn't done much about before. You see, even aid to education, K through twelve, just came alive in the late sixties. The government just wasn't doing that much before, so all of a sudden, we had a whole bunch of new constituents or constituent type problems that had to be dealt with.

There were members of the legislature who were strong advocates of local government who probably pushed this type of involvement, i.e., Assemblyman Frank Lanterman of La Canada.

New Life for the Department of Commerce in 1971: Ed Gillenwaters as Director; Space Shuttle; Drug Abuse Task Force; Veterans Unlimited##

Sharp: The Department of Commerce was revived or resurrected in 1971, and Mr. Gillenwaters came in as the head of it. Why did this happen?

Reinecke: Well, it started off as a commission. First, we had a commission on economic development which was just--I'm pretty sure it was at my urging. The governor was very good to me. I'd go to him with

Reinecke: any kind of a crazy idea and he'd say, "Sure." That's how I became the science advisor and that's how I got the Office of Science and Technology, that's how I got the drug program, that's how I got a lot of these things, energy, et cetera.

But I was always concerned about small business. That's the reason I went to Congress in the first place. And I thought that the state was not doing anything to even recognize the problems of encouraging or generating a climate that was conducive to forming new businesses or to encourage businesses out of state to come into state. So we kind of started that way. Then we had that bill that went through that established the--I think it was still just a commission at that point, I don't think it was a full department--on a temporary basis. Subsequently, it became a Department of Commerce.

Sharp: The California Commission for Economic Development?

Reinecke: Maybe that was sort of a management board advisory to the department. But, yes, when that came to me, Ed Gillenwaters had just been fired by the governor's office--there were some kinds of personality conflicts. I liked him. I thought he was a very effective guy. Sometimes pretty aggressive to his own disadvantage, but I called the governor, I remember, one night when I heard he was fired. I called him and I said, "Do you have any objections to my hiring him."

He said, "No, I like him."

He had been in the governor's office, the governor's representative in Washington, D.C. Then he came out and he got into an interoffice scrabble in the corner office and got--came out on the short end of the straw.

So I picked him up and I think he was very, very effective. He and I worked together--had lunch together this week, as a matter of fact. And we're still good friends, even though we got ourselves into a lot of mess later.

But nevertheless, the objectives were there and he's a hard-selling, hard-driving guy that I think is very effective. We were lucky to have him.

Sharp: I'm wondering how the efforts to revive the department set the scene for the efforts to bring the space shuttle and part of that industry to the state.

Reinecke: Well, obviously, aerospace was one of the major assets that we had in this state. I won't say it was faltering, but it wasn't getting any help from the state government.

That's when John Hay of the State Chamber of Commerce came in, and he was so very, very helpful. He raised the money for the thing and we put together this task force. It was chaired by Alan Cranston and myself. Cranston was to do the work in Washington, which, frankly, he didn't do much of, but it was during the Nixon years, and so, you know, he's got limitations there.

But out here, we did put a hard-driving, technical team together and we created a book which I still have if it's of any interest to you. It's about a three-quarter inch book showing why California is the place: (A) to build the shuttle and (B) to launch the shuttle. And there were four things. One was the construction contracts. We were a little bit involved in that, but not heavily. In fact, we were asked by Rockwell and Lockheed and the others to please stay out of it because they felt they could do better with their own technical staffs than we could. So we helped around the edges, but we did not get heavily involved.

But then there was a question of where is it tested--that is, the horizontal flight testing--and we won that for Edwards Air Force Base, and that's where it was done. We allowed--we gave up, so to speak--on the vertical testing, because we knew the Kennedy site was already in effect and in place, and it was cost-effective to do it, so we said nothing there. But then we bid very, very hard to get Vandenberg as the ongoing operational site. We were successful there although I don't know if they're changing their minds on that now or not.

But as a result, three of the four things did come to California that brought many billions of dollars worth of work here. Over a period of time, assuming that they do eventually launch out of Vandenberg. The reason there was that they wanted to go in a north-south orbit which they can't do out of Cape Kennedy without going over southern Florida and then over Cuba. And they were very, very concerned with going over Cuba at that point. That was a major factor. There were other states. We were in competition with Texas, with Utah, I think Illinois was in it.

So anyway, we had to develop sort of a competitive program to show that California had the resources. The University of California was one of the major resources because of the technical resource and the major libraries and the energy sources and the

Reinecke: physical resources, namely being Vandenberg. Not only because Vandenberg was already a government site, but because you could fire due south from there for these stationary orbits, and not cross over any populated land for some--I forget how many thousand of miles. A long way.

Sharp: What was the network like of meeting with representatives from UC or from other places to try to formulate the package?

Reinecke: We had--let's see, Bob [Robert] Volk [Jr.] was one of the co-chairman and, oh, what was his name, he was from Newhall Land and Farming Company and he was the chairman of the board at that time. I can still see his face, but I can't say his name. I'm sorry. I think it's in this book, if we get together on that.

Anyway, we had a pretty significant committee of, oh, forty or fifty. A lot of aerospace types in there, a lot of--I don't remember too many UC types, to tell you the truth. But we had a lot of industry type, chamber of commerce types that were helping us. And then we had a staff that wrote this, did all this technical work, and there was some very excellent research went into it. Because the quantities of energy, along--at that time, there just wasn't that much liquid oxygen available. The ongoing energy requirements are significant for the shuttle. So that was part of it, too.

Anyway, it was a good job and it was well done. I went back and made the presentations to NASA [National Aeronautics and Space Administration]. I went back several times to NASA and DOD [Department of Defense]. We met with NASA and DOD together. I met with--I think Cap [Caspar] Weinberger was in the White House, at that time, or was it George [P.] Shultz? Maybe both or it might have been one-- they might have shifted in the middle, there. Anyway, that was when I remember first meeting George Shultz.*

Then we had meetings, bipartisan meetings, one of the only ones of the year, as I remember, from the congressional delegation. They all came to listen, because it meant jobs and business for the state of California. It was a good effort because it was one chance that you could do something on a bipartisan basis where it would help everybody.

*George Shultz was director of the Office of Management of the Budget between 1970 and 1972. Caspar Weinberger was his deputy director in this period, becoming director in 1972. Weinberger became counsellor to the president in 1973.

Reinecke: So we had excellent response there and put out this book. If I remember right, we spent about \$125,000 all of which was raised by contributions through the State Chamber of Commerce. So they financed the whole thing for us. In my office in Los Angeles--I had an LA office, too, in the old state building, the one that was torn down--we had this whole crew of, I guess eight or ten people working for better than a year on this project. It was one of my better programs.

Sharp: Are there less spectacular efforts, similar to this idea of bringing more industry to California, that you might like to talk about to sort of counterbalance the space shuttle effort?*

Reinecke: The only other thing that I recall--well, the drug abuse task force that I had. That again, that was just all contributed. There was no money in that at all. But through our efforts--and we got a lot of great cooperation out of people in Washington, the Justice Department and city and local government, I mean county and sheriffs and city governments and state--we did an awful lot. It was just amazing the amount that was done. It got so successful, that it became a department in state government.

Sharp: The drug abuse one.

Reinecke: The drug abuse. It started off with just another one of these no-pay task force type things where we had police, sheriffs, federal and state people working together with ourselves. And we sort of defined the problem and started making some kind of things. In particular, I became involved with it at the border because of the Commission of the Californias, another thing that I had to do with Mexico. As I think I mentioned before, I suggested that computer program which subsequently blossomed into something fairly big down there. That was one of the products of this little task force.

But we got into packaging, and we got the drug manufacturers involved. They were most cooperative. Before, they would package in pallets and they didn't care what product was anywhere. It turned out--and we only found this out from some of these local police and

*During his review of the transcript, Mr. Reinecke mentioned other efforts which the Department of Commerce conducted to attract industry to California. These efforts included a "big tourism effort and conference with Bill Lane [L.W. Lane, Jr.]" and the setting up of "a blue ribbon agricultural committee which put out a fine list of recommendations to help agriculture in the state."

Reinecke: sheriffs--that the people were stealing the boxes around the edges. They could identify them and they would simply, if they found a bunch of amphetamines or barbs [barbiturates], they'd simply pull that box out of the pallet and let it go. So then they repackaged to where the dangerous drugs, so to speak, were all in the center, and the aspirins and the whatever, the milk of magnesia, was on the outside. So it was a matter of security.

Also, we found over and over again that the manufacturers were trans-shipping. How was that working? They'd ship with a label that went to Tijuana or Mexicali, but at the border, it never got there. Somehow it was trans-shipped in a warehouse and it just came back in as a drug shipment, directly into the hands of some sort of a drug distributor. And so they tightened up the--I know what it was. The manufacturers agreed finally--and the drug industry was very cooperative on this--they agreed not to ship into Mexico at all, because all the majors had their own manufacturing facilities in Mexico City or Guadalajara or somewhere else.

I said, "Look, you take care of Tijuana and Mexicali out of Guadalajara or Mexico City. We'll take care of San Diego out of this side."

So we stopped all shipments going across the border. That's where there was a lot of monkey business. So that cleaned it up a little bit. And as I said, then the computer thing on the ID, I guess I explained that to you last time.*

Sharp: With this drug trafficking and with the Commission of the Californias, did you have to introduce specific legislation that detailed some of these plans?

Reinecke: No, I don't believe we did. We just did it. By this time, I was starting to get pretty cynical about these things, and if I saw something that had to be done, I didn't-- If it was a benign thing, well, I just went ahead and did it.

But then Ed Meese in the governor's office, I know, was very close to John--. I don't remember his name. He was a BNE [Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement] in San Diego. John Somebody who later went back to the Justice Department in Washington. A fine man. He was on our task force. So he, I guess, was talking with Ed.

*pp. 39-40.

Reinecke: One day Ed just said, "Look, this thing's gotten too involved and too big to be handled without better information."

So then the governor established an Office of Drug Abuse Enforcement or something like that and they took it away from me. So I lost it. Which is all right, again. I got the thing started and that's fine.

I don't like running operations anyway. I like to start things and then let somebody else take over the management. So that's what happened.

That still exists today. That was finally put into statute, I believe. Instead of just an office in the governor's office, it became a full statutory department. I don't know what they're doing now, but I hope it's a good job.

Sharp: I have a couple of other questions about the commission, but we can talk about them later. Part of the Department of Commerce, I mean, the idea was to bring more industry to California, again. Was this in any way connected with the Office of Small Business?

Reinecke: No. I don't think we had one, did we?

Sharp: Yes.

Reinecke: That would have been, if anything, in the Office of Intergovernmental Management, cause we were trying to do that stuff. As I mentioned before, we had a job task force for Vietnam veterans, and we did an awful lot on that. We had a name for it; a slogan--oh shoot, I don't remember it--but it turned out to be good for me politically, because off of a sudden, my name was throughout all the veterans' organizations in the state, of which I was a member anyway because I am a disabled veteran and also WW II--as Archie [Bunker] says, "The Big One."

Sharp: The last one, right?

Reinecke: The last one. I hope it's the last one. So I was a member of VFW [Veterans of Foreign Wars] and American Legion and Disabled American Veterans and all that stuff. Cause I knew a lot of these guys, and there were some very compassionate needs, some very real, genuine needs for these people. Particularly the Vietnam veterans who just weren't making it. We're hearing a lot more about that now.

- Reinecke: So we didn't have some thing and what we did in that case, again through the state chamber--we used their mailing lists, or they did the mailing for us (they didn't give us their list), but just urging people to hire one veteran. And you know, when you get 20,000 factories out there, if you get one guy on board half of them, you've hired 10,000 veterans. And we were pretty successful on--Veterans Unlimited, something Unlimited, I don't know. Anyway, so that was part of that program and that again was purely just a voluntary thing that we just picked up, saw a need and tried to do something for it.
- Sharp: It's an interesting part of the volunteerism, encouraging businesses to do what they could for certain groups of people whether it was minorities or veterans or--
- Reinecke: I've always been totally colorblind. If there was a need in a minority area, I'd certainly help that, but I did it because it was a human need more than a minority need in any case.

The Reapportionment Commission, 1971

- Sharp: One of the stickier issues--sticky because it's difficult to understand and, I think, to talk about--is reapportionment, because it sort of keeps going on and on forever.
- Reinecke: Yep.
- Sharp: I saw a note that there was something called a "reapportionment commission" that met in December of 1971.
- Reinecke: That's right. It was in the state constitution.
- Sharp: And you called it.
- Reinecke: That's right.
- Sharp: Why did you do that?
- Reinecke: Okay. There was a statement in the state constitution that simply said, "If the legislature does not reapportion by such and such a time," and I think normally, reapportionment is done in the first year after the decennial census, the first year, '71, in this case. They didn't do it in '71, and I think the constitution said if it was not done by the end of the second year after the census (which

Reinecke: would have been '72), then a commission composed of the lieutenant governor, the attorney general, the state controller, I think the superintendent of education, and the secretary of state, if I remember right, shall be convened. It didn't say "may," it said "shall."

The legislature, which wanted to protect its prerogative reapportionment, had passed a bill, but it was very gerrymandered and Reagan vetoed it. It was the Democratic-controlled legislature and Reagan vetoed it. So there was no reapportionment. I read it very literally that the lieutenant governor was the chairman, and that was named in the constitution also. So it said, "--shall be convened to reapportion the state." So I did.

It was interesting. I called the governor's office and they said, "Boy, that's a bomb. If you want to do it, go ahead, but it's your problem, not ours."

I said, "Well, I don't care about that." So then I called the leader of each house of the legislature, the minority and the majority leader.

And both Republicans said, "Fine, go ahead." I think Moretti was the chairman of the assembly, the speaker of the assembly at the time.

And Bob, I think I told you before, was always a good friend. He said, "Well, geez Ed, that's not the way it's done."

I said, "I know, but you guys didn't get it done."

So he said, "Go ahead."

Then I called--and I'll never forget this one--Moscone. It took three or four calls to reach him and I finally got him in San Francisco. And I've never been called so many foul, vile names in my life as what George told me over the phone. I knew George fairly well, cause I worked with him in the senate. Not worked with him, but worked alongside. I just never heard a man spew out as much venom as George Moscone did on that particular call.

I finally just said, "Well, I'm sorry, George. To me it's a very clear enumeration within the constitution that I 'shall' convene it, and I'm just giving you notice."

He slammed the phone down on me and that was the end of it. So I went ahead and did it.

Reinecke: It was kind of a fun thing. We established criteria. We did the same thing that has been done ever since as far as, you know, two assembly districts make one senate district, and communities of interest, and so forth. All the stuff that was in Proposition 6 back in about '76 or '78, whenever it came through. That started out of that commission.

Anyway, we went forward and we held hearings all over the state. We stole some staff from somebody, I don't know where, and a computer, and we put the doggone thing together and came up with some lines that looked very reasonable. I mean, reasonable from the people's point of view. Very unreasonable from the politician's point of view. Oh yes, our criteria was that the location of the incumbent's residence not be a factor, which really blows their minds. That's why I was really getting less and less popular in the legislature.

So finally, somebody sued--I forget who. And it went to the state supreme court and the supreme court found the commission unconstitutional and that was the end of the commission. That was the end of the story.

But it was just a very clear mandate that the lieutenant governor "shall" convene a commission made up of thus and so, and reapportion the state. So I just went ahead with what the constitution said.

Sharp: How long did the commission last?

Reinecke: About four or five months, I guess. There was a lot of publicity on it. We had some good maps, really, they were--

Sharp: As good as any you've seen so far?

Reinecke: Looked a lot like the Sebastiani plan as presented for an initiative in 1983. The California Supreme Court knocked it off the ballot as unconstitutional, as I remember.* And not because it was pro-Republican. It turned out--any fair reapportionment turns out--to be better to the Republican party than what exists today, because we're living with a very hard Democrat-gerrymandered

*The interviewer-editor asked Mr. Reinecke to briefly explain the Sebastiani plan, during his review. He replied, "The Sebastiani plan was drawn on principles very similar to those mentioned previously in no regard for registration, address of incumbents, but full recognition of community interests, etc."

Reinecke: apportionment today. So anything that's done on a "fair" basis, and I don't mean that improperly here, but anything done on a dispassioned basis will hurt the incumbents. Democrats and Republicans right now, cause they're all fat and happy.

Sharp: And in skewed situations--

Reinecke: In a manner to strengthen themselves. That's right. Both Republicans and Democrats.

Sharp: As the work went on, this four or five months that the commission lasted, what kind of contact did you have with members of the senate or the assembly?

Reinecke: Very little. I didn't ask them. Oh, I remember them making comments to me, but it wasn't a concern. We established our own criteria, we established Robert's Rules of Order, we got back the old fellow, Beek [Joseph Allan Beek], I think his name was that used to be the parliamentarian--he wrote a book on parliamentary procedure. And we got him back to be--he was in retirement, an old fellow seventy-eight or eighty or so, and he was just delighted to be recognized again. He came down and he sat with us in our meetings, and we held meetings in San Francisco and Sacramento and LA. I think we had about five, I'm not positive. But anyway, he was right there doing everything for us.

I'll never forget, it was a funny thing in retrospect now. It turns out that we all sat down. Ev [Evelle J.] Younger had to go someplace else, so he excused himself, and that left it a two-to-two vote. And all of a sudden Flournoy gets up and he says, "I've got to go someplace."

So it left Jerry Brown, and Wilson Riles, and myself. Then Jerry made some motion, whatever it was, and I called for the vote. It was all done--we'd adopted, I guess it was Robert's Rules of Order. And the press was very much interested and very much in existence in the audience. I called the roll or had the secretary call the roll, whatever it was, and of course, it was a two-to-one vote. And I was about to ask the parliamentarian if, in fact, less than a majority--after we convened, can three out of the five still conduct business when only two voting yes would prevail?

Sharp: So it was a quorum.

Reinecke: It was a quorum question. And as I just turned to Beek and started to talk about that, I remember Jerry Brown yelling out, "Passed," or "Adopted," or something, whatever it was. It was something in his favor and it was really funny.

Of course, the press loved it and they all laughed, and that's what all got written up the next day. They didn't talk about the real meat of the cocoanut.

But anyway, then we got sued and blown out of the water, and that's all there was to it.

Sharp: The specter of you and Jerry Brown and Wilson Riles sitting in the same room talking about this kind of thing--it seems so unlikely.

Reinecke: It wasn't bad at all, in fact Jerry and I, I won't say we're close friends, but his office was directly below mine in the Capitol, and so we used to get together on, oh, two or three occasions. We had, I think, a lot in common. I'm sort of a maverick and he was too. He proved his point better than I did, but nevertheless, we were arm's-length friends. So that was not an unusual sight.

And at that point, I used to help Wilson Riles on some of his requests for educational money and things, and I helped him on the board of regents. I helped him on the board of trustees; I remember I got the new library for Sac State [California State University at Sacramento] by a little behind-the-scenes stuff. Just requests and maneuvering. They had so much money to spend, it was a question of priorities, and I talked long enough and hard enough that we got a new library for Sac State, for instance. That was about '71 or '72, somewhere in there.

President of the Senate and Acting Governor

Sharp: That's really where I want to go next in talking about your role in the senate and working on bills. There's two different tacks really. One is the bills that you signed, which may have been accidental. The other is the bills that you worked on, you know, the ones that you were interested in and advocated. Maybe you could separate out some of those bills for me.

Reinecke: Sure. I advocated very few bills except the ones we've talked about: the economic development thing, the coastline--I don't remember a heck of a lot of them. I just made it a point to stay out of it. I felt it was kind of a conflict of interest, and so I did not advocate very strongly many bills. I did a few, but very, very few. I never voted. I never broke a tie in six years--there was never a tie to be broken, is what I mean--in the senate. As president of the senate, I was the tie-breaker in the event of a draw. But that never happened, and so that wasn't a problem. I just kept a good relationship with the senators. So my advocacy was not significant, is what I'm saying, except in a couple of cases.

As far as the bills I signed, of course, that was done when Reagan was out of the state. His office told us at one point, that in the six years that I was there, that I had been acting governor for three hundred and some days. I forget the number now, Three hundred twenty or three hundred thirty. So it was almost a year, so to speak. Cause he was going out a good bit on speaking engagements and things of that nature. Or occasionally, you know--he took a trip to Europe for three weeks once or whatever it was, and he went to the Philippines and Japan or something.

So he was out of the state a great deal on the mashed potato circuit or for the president. So totalled up, I was acting governor for some over three hundred days. In the process, of course, bills would come down and they had to be signed or vetoed. And I vetoed a few and I signed a few. With a little problem with the governor's office because I didn't necessarily take their recommendations on everything. So I signed a couple they didn't want me to sign and I vetoed a couple they didn't want me to veto. But I was acting governor, so that was the way it went. It was just their tough luck department.

Sharp: The one that you advocated, the Sacramento State library, was that--

Reinecke: That was not legislation. That was just a matter of capital building fund within the budget, and it was a matter of allocation as to where it was going to go. And the director of Finance had a great deal--now he was the one that basically established that, so that would have been either a Verne Orr thing or whoever it was at the time. I just managed to convince them that it was a very real need. And that was brought to my attention, primarily because my wife's ex-brother-in-law was a professor at Sac State in business law, and he pointed out to me some of the very real needs they had there. So I just went to bat for him and was successful.

Sharp: Is that the only relationship that you had with the senate?

Reinecke: Well, you know, there's always sort of a social thing, but I felt then, and I still feel, that the lieutenant governor has no business being in the senate. If he's there because of his accessibility to the governor or, in the event the governor can no longer serve, to become governor, then I don't think he has any business being in the legislature. He's a member of the administration and should be there solely.

But this was a constitutional thing and it goes way, way back. So, I took that duty rather lightly, to be very honest with you, cause I felt it was wrong.

So there were lots of times I was not there. I'd go in--in fact, I used to use the senate to get away from the telephone and I enjoyed it because I can go in there and rest. It doesn't take much to preside over the senate. At times it got a little sticky, but from a parliamentary point of view, that wasn't a problem. So it was just a nice way to get away from the phone and the office staff and everybody else. I could go in there and they couldn't reach me.

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Reinecke: I was in there one day and all of a sudden--Willie [Brown] had rejected my budget. It was for my office, and I think it was the Office of Economic Development or something. So I was in there hiding from the world up on the podium and all of a sudden Willie walks in the back of the room and came right up on the podium with me. So while the senators were debating, why, we go off to the side and we kibitz about my budget.

I think he always intended to grant the budget, which he did subsequent to that, but I think it was just the way--it was the first time I ever got to know Willie and the way he deals out his authority. He was then chairman of Ways and Means, he wasn't speaker.

So he came up and it was just a very pleasant little chat that we had. He asked me to justify in some manner a few of the items on the budget, and I did. Then he said, "Well, we'll give it some thought," and subsequently he did.

So I owed him one. I guess that's the bottom line. But it was very pleasant. We always had good relationships.

Sharp: It seems to me though, that, especially since you'd come from Congress, that it would have been hard not to want to get into advocacy.

Reinecke: It's a valid question, but I don't remember--. I did get involved, yes, I did a little bit, excuse me. Not on advocacy of legislation, but I remember assemblyman (now a congressman) Gene [Eugene A.] Chappie called me in at one point to help him fight the Dos Rios Dam that was being proposed up here in Round Valley in northern California.

Because I was familiar with the Corps of Engineers feasibility type reports, I was able to take the book home. It was about a four-inch-thick report. I read it one weekend and came up with a very significant error that was made by the corps in the amount of interest that they were charging on the money. And by correcting it to the current interest rate--they had used an old, old rate to hold their interest costs down--by correcting it to the current rate, which was right because I had just left the Committee on the Interior, why, it made the dam unfeasible. We blew the benefit-cost ratio on the dam. Where they had it up at 1.25-to-1 benefit over cost, after they plugged in the correct interest rate, it reduced the benefit-cost ratio to .89 or something.

Ike Livermore was delighted, of course. I showed it to him and he ran back and jumped into his computers and came up with this new benefit-cost ratio, and then he came back to me. So he and I went to a cabinet meeting and simply urged the governor that if the dam is not economically efficient, in addition to all of the environmental questions plus the Indian questions, we urged him not to approve the construction of the dam, and he didn't. So we saved a dam, just by finding one little error in the interest rate calculations.

Sharp: Mr. Reagan sometimes uses that example as being pro-Indian.

Reinecke: Well, he was in this case. He went along with our argument. I've never seen him say that.

Sharp: Other people have attributed it to him--that this was something to help the Indian cause, and that that was a prime--

Reinecke: Well, he was sensitive to it. I remember that. It didn't take much talking. But when we gave him a good excuse--a good, hard numbers type excuse--then he said okay then.

Reinecke: The same thing when I argued against--they were going to build a new highway from, I forget where it was now, Merced or--but somewhere across the Sierras. And oh, the CalTrans--I don't think it was called CalTrans then, but the Department of Transportation or something--they were jumping to go. I argued against that, not on cost, cause I don't think we had any, but just that, "Look, we've got about five roads going across the Sierras right now--" (cause I used to do a lot of time in the Sierras--I used to hike a lot in the High Sierras).

And I said, "You just don't need it, Governor. There's no economic justification for this. They can go north or south to a different highway," whatever it was. Because it was going to come right out by the Devil's Postpile.

I said, "This would be a disgrace: to cut right through the most beautiful part of the High Sierra country with a blacktop ribbon."

So then he accepted that. And again, Ike Livermore and I used to argue on this together. I mean, he and I were on the same side.

So then they staged a news conference by taking a horseback ride into the hills, and I'm allergic to horses, so I couldn't go along. So I don't know what was there.

Testifying Before the United States Senate Judiciary Committee in 1972, and the Bid for Governorship in 1974

Sharp: The only other section that I had to ask you about, is everything that happened in 1974. And I don't really know how to ask you about it. I have some basic questions.

Reinecke: Well, go ahead, that's all right. I have no secrets.

Sharp: Well, I know you don't, and I'm glad that you want to talk about it, cause I think it's really central to what political history you have in California.

From the period of 1972--mid-1972 on--through October of '74, it seems to me you had a lot of different things going on besides just being lieutenant governor, because there was the issue of your testifying before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee.

Reinecke: Yes, that's true.

Sharp: How did you reconcile all the different things that were going on?

Reinecke: Well, I guess it has to come back to a basic premise that I didn't feel then, and I don't feel today, that I ever told a lie or did anything wrong. So I had nothing to run from, nothing to hide from, and as such, it didn't deter me until the end when it finally got into a trial-preparation stage.

But we were going gung-ho. We were delightedly happy that we were able to successfully get the Republican national convention to come to San Diego. That was our whole objective in this thing, because tourism was a part of this Department of Commerce--Manufacturing, tourism, and agriculture are the three major employment functions at the time, and that's what we were after. The space shuttle was the manufacturing side of the thing. We also did a big thing on agriculture. That's another story.

But anyway, on tourism, we thought: let's bring some major convention. And we tried to get both the Democrat and the Republican conventions. As it turned out, unfortunately, I was successful in getting the Republican. But it didn't deter me, because I felt that we did a good job, and I was very disappointed they didn't come out with the convention, because I think it could have been a good one.

But all the intrigue that's involved here and the question of my perjury--it just isn't true. As it said in that article that you sent me,* every scrap of evidence they ever got, I took to them and handed them two full briefcases jammed full of all the notes and records I had in my office: way, way back early before there was even a special prosecutor, trying to say, "Look, if you think there's a problem, here's everything I know and everything I've got. Take a look at it and ask me anything you want."

I even waived my attorney-client privilege, because I just wanted them to understand there was absolutely nothing to hide.

But I found out later that the motivation for this whole thing was far more sinister than I had conceived or believed. It was just a political turkey-shoot and I was the turkey. And I was told this by people in the Justice Department later.

*See "The Downfall of Ed Reinecke," by Leo Rennert, in California Journal, September 1974, and Sacramento Bee, 2 October 1974, p. A1, "Reinecke Gets Suspended Term," also by Leo Rennert.

Reinecke: Just statistically in the evidence, John Tunney was very much involved in this thing. It was he who first called me and asked me if I ever talked to John Mitchell. And I told him yes. Then it was he who asked the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee to ask me back to be his eyewitness. It was, I found out later from executive notes, executive session notes of the Senate, that it was John Tunney who made the motion to send my testimony to the Justice Department for investigation of perjury. It was John Tunney, who on his own testimony in court, worked with the special prosecutor, met with him four or five times and met with [Leon] Jaworski, I think, once. Finally, it was John Tunney who testified against me. So there's a fairly well-established line there.

I think, in the final analysis, that it was just a question that there were some people within the Democrat party--and this is just strictly speculation, now. John Tunney and Teddy [Edward] Kennedy are very close friends. They were roommates in college. They didn't need another Ronald Reagan as governor of California if Teddy was going to go anywhere on the national ticket. So they wanted to get rid of what appeared to be their most formidable opponent. I really think that's the bottom line to the whole thing.

So Tunney took it upon himself to do the things I just said he did, and he was very successful.

But there was no lying. The worst you can say is that there was a misunderstanding or a question of semantics. Because what I was convicted of was a question late in the day. We'd been up sitting there before these Senators. It was really--it was a disgraceful session. I don't say it because of my position. They were all just making arm-waving speeches for home consumption, that kind of stuff, you know. Typical of that stuff.

But anyway, Senator Hiram Fong, a Republican who came in late in the day--hadn't been there all day long, didn't know what was going on--he started with a few predicate type questions saying, "You met with Mitchell on this date," and, "You did not meet on this date," and, "You did meet on this date."

I said, "That's right, Senator."

Then he went on and asked a bunch of other questions. Then he came back and he said, "All right, then you had no conversation with Mitchell before such and such a date."

Reinecke: I said, "That's quite true."

And, "That's quite true," was the word on which I was convicted.

I still to this day think he was talking about the meetings, because he started off saying, "You met, you didn't meet, and you did meet."

I said, "That's true."

Never talking about any other type of conversation in the whole seven or eight hours, they never asked about telephone calls, they never asked about telegrams, they never asked about correspondence. It was really pretty stupid on their part. As investigators, they'd go bust.

The whole day was on meetings. I counted out at the time, it was for my own lawyers in the case, it was 330 or something times they referred to meetings and questions, and never once a phone call, never once a telegram, never once a letter. Because I did send some letters and telegrams.

So when Fong, at the end of this long day finally said, "So you had no conversation," I took that to mean face to face conversation.

Unfortunately, we tried to get Senator Fong to testify. The judge would not allow it. He would allow only one Senator and my attorney. I don't think it was a good decision, but it was my attorney's decision--said he thought I could impeach Tunney's testimony better than anybody else's and show that it was a political thing.

Well, my attorney didn't do a very good job. He tried, but he didn't do a very good job on that and we never got Fong before the committee--the trial--at all.

You know, perjury--you not only have to tell a lie, you have to show intent to tell a lie. And the word "intent," I don't believe, was ever used in the whole trial--in fourteen or twelve days of trial or whatever it was--I don't think the word "intent" was ever brought up. I tried to convince my lawyer that that should be pointed out to the jury, because the judge said it very clearly in the beginning when he gave his opening instructions. That you not only have to prove that a misstatement was made, but that it was intended to for some ulterior reason or motive. And they never proved that, because they never talked about it.

Reinecke: And we were never able to defend against it because we couldn't get Fong to say, "Here's what I thought." You know, "Looking at my testimony, I think I meant this," or whatever.

So it was a kangaroo court. There's no question about it. When the thing was, of course, finally thrown out on appeal, it was thrown out on the very interesting point. The papers all just wrote it up as a technicality of quorum. Well, that's true. Except that there never should have been a trial, because of the quorum. So whether I was guilty or not never should have ever been decided. Because in the federal statute, there are four, I think it's four--three or four--basic functions. One, you have to tell a lie; two, you have to have intent; three, it has to be before what's called a competent tribunal. A competent tribunal is a court, or you know, a duly constituted thing, and a quorum is a part of that. You can't have a one-man quorum.

Well, what has happened, and this is something the press never picked up on: The rules of the Senate are that you have to have a majority of 50 percent plus one to constitute a quorum. And that's what they use. It also says that any committee can establish its own rules annually to have whatever they want for a quorum. They do that all the time. That's why you go back there and there's one person as a quorum.

As it turned out here, the Senate Judiciary Committee had not established--because it's supposed to be done annually, it says so in the Senate rules that you have to pass these rules every year--they had not done it for three years. So there was a very real question that everything the Senate Judiciary Committee did for three years was subject to defeat by virtue of lack of a quorum.

Sharp: If somebody tried--

Reinecke: If somebody wanted to. And ACLU [American Civil Liberties Union] took a hard look at it. But they said, "My God, it's too vast."

So we presented this to the judge before the trial, that they couldn't do it. So the special prosecutor's office said, "Gee, we have to get a statement from the Senate and they're very busy right now. We ask for a ten-day postponement." So they got it. They asked for a second postponement, they asked for a third postponement which got it past the primary, and by then I was defeated in my run for the nomination for governor.

Reinecke: Finally, when it finally came up for decision, it was like a week or so before the trial. My attorney brought the subject up because it was a motion that had been filed on the first pre-trial hearing back in April, I think it was, and the trial was in July. And all these postponements had taken us up into sometime after the primary and, before the trial--a week or ten days.

The prosecutor said, "We still haven't got that resolution from the senate."

So instead of the judge saying, "Look, damn it, I've given you three postponements now," he said, "Well, are you prepared for trial?"

I said, "Yes."

He said, "Are they prepared for trial?"

"Yes,"

He said, "Well, then, let's just declare the point moot. Motion denied." And that was the end of it. So that motion was never decided upon. It was considered moot. It was the first point in our appeal--we had fifteen major points in the appeal, and this was the first one. The appellate court, fifteen months later, looked at it, and that was the only point they ever read. They agreed unanimously that there never should have been a trial. Well, excuse me, they didn't say that. They agreed unanimously that the trial was not valid because a quorum was never established.

So while it is a technicality, it's like not having a body for a murder, you know. You have to prove--you've got to have certain basic elements before you have a crime. They didn't have one of the elements.

And they knew it. That's what hurt. One of the prosecutors, Rich Davis--the main guy--told my lawyer aside, as lawyers are wont to do, "We know we'll never get this resolution, but we're just using it as a stall."

That's what burns me up because, you know, whether it's I or somebody else, that's not justice in the American flavor, as far as I'm concerned. If they knew they didn't have it, then they should have admitted it and said, "Sorry, folks, we don't have a case."

Reinecke: And they knew it very clearly that there was not a quorum so--I've got another man writing a book. He just wrote to me and I've got to answer him about this point: He said something like, "There was always one person there because somebody was always talking to you."

Well, sure. There was one, two, three, four, five Senators there. I don't know how many. It was never logged in, so we don't know. But a quorum of that committee was--I think it was a committee of seventeen--so it would have taken nine people to be a quorum. There were very seldom times where there were ever nine there because they simply forgot to pass their dumb little rule about the one-man quorum.

So it really goes back to the responsibility of the Senate staff and the chairman--but the staff, basically--on three successive years. I have somewhere a copy of a memo that was put out by the secretary of both the Senate and the House pointing this out to all committees, that if you haven't done it, you'd better get with it, and it cited my case. That was--so forth and so on.

So anyway, as far as what really happened, as I said, I never lied, so it never bothered me. Even in defeat, I was never bowed or broken, so I went forward as though nothing had ever happened, just a tough bump.

Sharp: During this period after mid-'72, when you had done the testifying, how did your relationship with Mr. Reagan change?

Reinecke: Not bad until it got up into '73, I think, when the whole Watergate thing broke open. In '72, it wasn't an issue. You know, I had testified, but, you know, it was just a bad headline. We got some bad ink there for a while, Ed Gillenwaters and I.

That was another point: that no perjury conviction historically has ever been found where two people were testifying at the same time. Because there's such an opportunity for confusion in directions and again, in semantics. And here we were, the two of us sitting side by side. It wasn't one and then the other, it was both of us. But that's just a historical thing.

The governor's office never chilled, but I saw Reagan less and less after, finally after the special prosecutor was appointed in, I think, about April or May or June or whatever it was of '73. No, it was later than that. No, it didn't really start spacing things out until after I was indicted, yes.

Reinecke: Well, it was an interesting thing. Somewhere in there between February of '74 when I went before the federal grand jury, and the indictment which wasn't until April of '74, I believe. I never told a soul except my own family that I was ever called before the grand jury. Obviously, it wasn't publicity, it was a secret grand jury, and nobody knew that I was there.

But some of Governor Reagan's people knew it. So they had some inside information somehow that I was not privy to. Because I went to one in particular and asked him for financial support. (I was still running for governor; I was going gung-ho because I was sure this thing was going to get thrown out.) And he turned me down for Hugh Flournoy which was a real anomaly to me, because Hugh [Houston I.] Flournoy was a moderate in his philosophy, moderate to liberal as far as Republicans are concerned.

It was just one of those things, that Reagan didn't like that philosophy at all. He was very much conservative. He and I got along great, and he had made some unbelievably wonderful statements on my behalf in front of lots of business type people, you know, about supporting me, and this and that. And all of a sudden, his "kitchen cabinet" turns against me.

So there was something happened then and I never did find out what. There was an article published sometime later in the Santa Monica Outlook wherein Holmes Tuttle, who was one of the "kitchen cabinet," made the statement that Reinecke was the worst mistake ever made in the Reagan gubernatorial years--the appointment of Reinecke was the worst mistake. I've never talked to him about it since, but, so, something obviously jelled right in there that I was not aware of.

I was told a little later, also, by somebody who was in the Department of Justice (who I won't name--and whose name I don't remember anyway) that there was a discreet inquiry made to the governor's office about whether or not they should actually prosecute me. The answer that came back from the governor's office--now from whom I don't know, I have no idea, I'm not sure Reagan ever even heard it--was that they saw no reason why the Department of Justice should not prosecute. So you've got to be careful of your friends, not your enemies.

So those are the kinds of things that started to take place. Yet to this day, I still love the guy, I mean Reagan. I don't have any use for some of his people, but I don't fault Reagan. I really don't think he made any decisions on this at all.

Reinecke: By my own choice, I did not--well, after I was convicted, after the trial, I did not go in the state senate again. Because if I was a convicted perjurer, that might cloud the validity of some bill that I might vote on or even rule over. And I didn't sign anything even though Reagan was out of the state a couple of times. I just chose not to sign things. I let them go until he came back because I didn't want to mess up something else down the line that may or may not affect me, but you know, could affect other people. So I just chose to be sort of a silent partner at that point.

Although, you know, I was still in the office every day and continuing, even after the conviction. I still couldn't believe it: I thought it was all going to be thrown out, which eventually it was, but I got thrown out before the case got thrown out.

Sharp: How was that? I mean, did people avoid you?

Reinecke: A lot of the official people did, yes, the legislators. Well, I didn't push myself. Obviously I knew I was running around with my tail between my legs, and I was sort of, I guess you'd say, the skunk at the church picnic. But only because of circumstances, not because of me.

The press suddenly got, I think, much friendlier to me. They had been very vicious, I think, and very unfair during the prosecution days, but then afterwards, they realized they'd played their game and they killed their mouse. The press got very, oh, I can't even think of the right word right now, but very solicitous and very helpful. Since then, I've had two members of the press say that they all felt pretty damn bad because they don't think I did anything wrong, and certainly nothing more than everybody else does every day of the week, and yet I took an awful beating for it.

Sharp: You know, there was an obvious impact on your bid for the governorship.

Reinecke: Oh! Very obvious. That was an interesting one, because Jerry Brown [Edmund G. Brown, Jr.] even told--as a matter of fact, it was Steve Merksamer who is now an executive assistant for Duke [George Deukmejian]-- He said--You know, it wasn't Brown, it was Brown's manager, Quinn, what was his name?

Sharp: Ed Quinn? Tony Quinn?

Reinecke: I thought it was Tom, but it's not the same Tom that was-- anyway, it was Quinn whoever.

Sharp: Sandy Quinn?

Reinecke: No. There's a Tony Quinn that works for the Republican caucus now and there's another Quinn. Well, anyway, it doesn't matter. He was the manager of Jerry's campaign. And he told Merksamer, he said, "We were lucky to beat Hugh Flournoy," and he says, "I'm sure we never could have beaten Reinecke."

So, in a very real sense, it changed the history of California to that extent. That is, there's a high probability that, had that judge simply thrown that thing out because of that motion, I think I would have won the nomination. I got 500,000 votes even in the primary which blew the minds of the people in Washington, I was told, that a guy under this kind of indictment with all this adverse press could conceivably get a half million votes. Flournoy got a million, but I had a half million.

So anyway, had that turned around, I might have been governor and there could have been a lot of things differently, obviously, as a result.

Sharp: Your relationship with the Republican party of California, I guess, must have been a disaster.

Reinecke: No, as a matter of fact--well, there was a lady in my office just the other day, just to name it specifically. She said, "Ed, you're the most loved man in the party."

And I don't think it ever changed. I really don't think so. I never backed away from anything. I just kept going to conventions, and I became a member of the El Dorado County Central Committee and an active member up there. So I think the people saw through this thing, and/or were just plain ol' sympathetic, I don't know which. But I've had so many people--

Hell, I had Larry O'Brien who was the national chairman of the Democratic National Committee--I met him during the pre-trial conference in Washington, in a restaurant. He came up to me, and I knew him when he was postmaster general when I was a congressman.

He said, "Ed, I can only apologize for what my party is doing to you."

Here's the national chairman saying this.

Reinecke: Phil [Phillip] Burton of San Francisco was on the Interior Committee, and I knew Phil quite well. He and I were friends. We disagreed philosophically, but we were good friends. And I was back there one day and went in on the House floor. You know, all old retired congressmen can go back on the floor if they're still recognized. And Phil made a statement which I won't make to you on tape, because he used some rather direct language, but he just couldn't understand it.

He said, "It's obvious what happened to you." And he said, "You got (bleep, bleep, bleep, bleep)."

So it was pretty obvious in the minds of lots of Democrats what happened. So as I say, maybe I'm just naive or refuse to see reality, but I never backed away from anything, and I never considered that anybody felt bad about me because of it. And I still don't.

Sharp: Although during the period before the primary, there was this article* that I sent you a copy of talking about the Republican funds.

Reinecke: Sure. They did their best to get me out of the race. That's right, that was before that. It was back in 19--. The reason I announced for governor clear back, I think it was July 28 or 29 of 1973, was because I had been ordered to get out of the race by somebody very close to the governor.

I said, "Bull-- (Bleep, bleep, bleep.) I don't play that way, and by God, this is an open game and I, if I don't have his support, that's too damn bad." But here's what happened.

Sharp: So that made you announce early.

Reinecke: Yes. Well, here's what it was: The first thing that happened was that there was a--a trial balloon went up. All of a sudden we hear everywhere that some of the kitchen cabinet are supporting Cap Weinberger for governor. And I'd just been to Washington and I said, "I can't believe that. Cap didn't sound like he was interested in coming home. He liked what he was doing."

So anyway, Lyn [Franklyn C.] Nofziger and I went out and saw Reagan one morning at his residence. And I said, "What's the story?"

*See following page, n.d.

Reinecke Charges Foes Dry Up Funds

LOS ANGELES (AP) — Lt. Gov. Ed Reinecke is bitter and resentful of what he calls "arm-twisting" methods used by fellow Republicans to cut him off from major sources of money for his campaign for governor.

The Republican primary campaign has been "not so clean behind the scenes in terms of some of the arm-twisting that has gone on for fundraising," he said.

Reinecke declines to blame Gov. Ronald Reagan or state Controller Houston I. Flournoy.

But he said, specifically, some of Reagan's wealthy supporters used threats of an undisclosed nature to force his finance chairman to drop out of his campaign and defect to Flournoy.

Since then, Flournoy has been able to outspend Rein-

ecke more than 6-1 in the GOP primary for governor.

Reinecke sought Wednesday to tie the taint of Watergate to Flournoy.

He said Flournoy's campaign spending reports filed this week with the secretary of state's office were on stationery of the Committee to Re-Elect the President.

"I don't think the Republican party in California wants to have anything to do with CREEP and what it did in 1972," Reinecke said.

Flournoy said that one of his campaign finance managers, Thomas Bauer, had handled campaign finance for CREEP. Bauer used some leftover forms in filling out Flournoy's first campaign report.

Flournoy said he was distressed to learn that some of his report sheets were on CREEP forms.

Reinecke: He said, "Ed, don't worry about it. It's just a couple of guys that are very close to Cap, and they just wanted to run up a balloon. Let it go and it'll pop and it'll come back down and you'll be in good shape."

So I did. Next thing I know, they were after Dave Packard to run. It just so happened I'd been to dinner with Dave Packard just a week or two before this thing hit the press or wherever I heard about it. I asked Dave if he ever wanted to run for anything, cause I thought he was an impressive man and obviously successful and so forth.

He said, "Gosh no. I hate to make public speeches, so I don't want to be a public figure."

So I thought, that's interesting. Then sure enough, all that balloon popped. And the next thing, then, they tried Bill Banowsky. By now, there was obviously a pattern forming. Bill Banowsky was the president of Pepperdine University--Pepperdine College--and a fine guy. I could see that one, cause at least Banowsky was a Reagan-type philosophically.

But then some controversy developed and I don't remember the details. Something over some contracts I don't know anything about. And then Bill, as a matter of fact, left, and I think he became president of the University of Oklahoma. I think that's where he is now. I'm not sure of that. But anyway, Bill slipped his way out of the picture.

Then come February when I went in to see Holmes Tuttle about financial support, that's when he told me he was supporting Hugh Flournoy. I knew all the stops were out at that point because Hugh was the last one they would ever support.

Sharp: Because he was too liberal.

Reinecke: Yes. But then, backing it up a little bit, at one point back in the days of the first balloon of Cap Weinberger, I had a general chairman, Arnold Beckman who was of Beckman Instruments, a delightful person. He was appointed by Gordon Luce who was then, I guess, state Republican party chairman. They called him the chairman of the Eleventh Commandment Committee, that being "Thou shalt not speak ill against any other Republicans." Very interesting. But one of the conditions was that Beckman could not be involved in anybody's campaign if he was in that position. I see it now as just a ploy to require that he resign from my campaign. Which he did.

Reinecke: A month or so after that, Lyn Nofziger and I were in a meeting in the Century Plaza Hotel and my finance chairman, who was Burt Raynes, another magnificent man of Rohr Aircraft (he's now retired), said, "Ed, I have to tell you something." He said, "I've been told to tell you to get out of the race."

He didn't want to tell me who, and he didn't tell me who. But I read between the lines pretty well.

I said, "Well, I'm sorry."

And he agreed with me. He said, "I don't want you to get out, but I was told by certain people to tell you to get out."

And Nofziger--he was furious, I was furious.

##

Reinecke: Well, I'm satisfied in my own mind, but I don't know it for a fact, and so I shouldn't make a historical statement on it. But I did say later--I did say, in the Santa Monica Outlook newspaper, that Holmes Tuttle made the statement that I was the worst mistake Reagan ever made, so you kind of have to assume there's some connection. But that's an assumption.

Anyway, so then, my next speech, interestingly enough, was a day or two later. I was up in the little town of Graeagle--a little town up in the top end of, I guess it's Sierra County or Plumas County, whatever it is, seventy-five miles north of Lake Tahoe. I was standing on a box or a barrel or something in the middle of--a cocktail reception--

Sharp: A soapbox?

Reinecke: It was some kind of a box. Just a box. It was in a little country club and there were fifty or seventy-five people there, and I made my official declaration of candidacy. I wasn't going to fool around.

Oh, I know--back in the meeting with Burt Raynes, I said, "What if I don't back out?"

His statement at the time was, "Well, it's all over. Everything's already put together."

I said, "Well, that's tough luck." Or maybe I said, "That's fine. If they're going their way, then I'll go mine."

Reinecke: So anyway, I declared. I said, "I want to send a loud and clear message that I'm going to run and I don't intend to back away for anything." This was '73, now, before any question had come up about my testimony. There was nothing. There had been some bad press the year and a half before because Senator Birch Bayh said somebody had lied at the hearing or whatever it was with Gillenwaters and me. But that was not an issue.

So I said, "Well, I'm going to make it loud and clear that they know where I am. And they can do what they want." So that's when I was up at Graeagle. I announced and here was some funny little reporter. A typical little guy with a press thing sticking out of his hat, you know, a real movie version of a reporter.

Sharp: Boy, that was his big story.

Reinecke: It turned out to be that he worked for the Quincy Times, and it was the only exclusive that newspaper ever got in a hundred and some years of publication.

But the reporter called the next day to Lyn Nofziger, who was my campaign chairman. And he said, "Lyn, your boss made a certain statement. Do you know anything about it?"

He said, "Good God, no! What did he say?" Cause I hadn't checked it out with Lyn. He was at the meeting; he knew what I was doing.

So when I got back to town, he called me. He said, "Hey, did you announce up in Graeagle last night?"

And I said, "Yes, I sure did."

He said, "Okay, I didn't know it." And that was it. So that's why I announced. It was kind of funny; and I think I still have that clipping.

The LA Times reported that declaration of candidacy on, I believe it was, page either 18 or 28, at the bottom of an obituary column. And I thought, what a classic putdown by the good old friends at the LA Times. But anyway, that's all there was to it.

Sharp: Why were they backing away from you then?

Harmer Is Named To Succeed Reinecke As Lt. Governor

BEE 10/3/74

Gov. Ronald Reagan has appointed State Sen. John Harmer as lieutenant governor to replace Ed Reinecke who quit shortly before he was sentenced for perjury yesterday.

The formal appointment of Harmer to the three months remaining in Reinecke's term was made in San Francisco.

Earlier Reagan said that he pondered the choice of Harmer, who is the Republican nominee for lieutenant governor, for some time, fearing the public might think a "deal" had been worked out to give Harmer an advantage in the race for a full term.

But Reagan said it would be "hypo-

critical" to appoint someone other than Harmer. "After all, I'm supporting him for election to the office," he said. "I gave up the idea of a caretaker for this office."

Meanwhile, Reinecke, who was sentenced to an 18-month suspended term and placed on a one-month unsupervised probation, slipped back into Sacramento last night aboard a commercial airline.

He was one of the first passengers off the flight and was whisked into a sedan that had been waiting in a "restricted" area of the airport and avoided newsmen.

Before he left Washington after the sentencing Reinecke said again that he is innocent of the perjury charge and plans to write a book entitled "So Help Me God." His wife said the book would "name names and people and places."

Reinecke has put his suburban Sacramento home up for sale and has been living with his family in his ranch near Placerville. He also has advertised his cattle for sale in an effort to pay off his legal fees of more than \$167,000.

Harmer, 40, of Glendale, is considered one of the most conservative

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Reagan Picks Harmer To Succeed Reinecke As Lieutenant Governor

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members of the State Senate. In floor debates he has often led the Reagan administration attack against bills that contain fat appropriations. He stresses the need to scrimp.

Time and again Harmer has emphasized the effect Mormonism had on his life. He says he gets an enormous amount of satisfaction "from harmonizing my work with the church."

His personal manner is on the formal side. He speaks in dignified tones and is no backslapper.

Harmer watchers love to tell the tale about the time he reached into a

refrigerator in the Senate lounge for what he thought was orange juice, took a swig and found out it was spiked. Harmer remembered the incident in an interview and said, "I couldn't talk for two days."

Harmer's Democratic opponent for a full term as lieutenant governor, State Sen. Mervyn Dymally, served notice that he will use Harmer's appointment as an issue in the campaign.

Dymally said Reagan's appointment of Harmer is a clear move "to fix the election." He said the move would prove the Republicans had failed to learn the lessons of Watergate.

Reinecke: I don't know. Mostly because I was sort of this maverick that I mentioned. I didn't go to the "kitchen cabinet" for permission, for anything. I didn't go to them for money. You know, they were Reagan's territory and I didn't pay any attention to them. It was the "kitchen cabinet," so to speak, is what I'm thinking of. I don't know why they didn't like me. I never had any arguments with them. I never crossed them up. I never did anything wrong. But they just made a decision that I wasn't their boy. And why, I don't know. You'd have to ask them. I feel it is this type of advice around Reagan that has won him the name of Teflon president. They just don't allow him to go close enough to get anything splashed on him.

Sharp: You know, some of the statements of some of your ideas about things remind me of Nofziger and some of his approaches to politics.

Reinecke: Yes, could be. Lyn and I got along very well.



Pete Wilson, with Ed Reinecke on dias at far right of photo.



George Deukmejian conferring with attendees. Pete Wilson and Ed Reinecke seated at right in photo.



Ed Reinecke

All photos taken at California Republican party gathering in 1982 at the Town and Country Hotel in San Diego, California.

III RETROSPECTIVE SUMMING UP: THE NEED FOR CULTURAL DIVERSITY
IN CALIFORNIA'S REPUBLICAN PARTY

- Sharp: The last question I have, really, brings you up to the present. Here you are now, head of the Republican party in California, and I'm wondering--you've sort of come full circle. I wondered what your perspective on that is.
- Reinecke: The trial and all of this stuff that we've just been talking about? I'm a little bit cynical, as I've said, about the procedures and the processes. I guess I don't like anybody playing God--and I don't mean Reagan. I'm thinking of these--everybody from Willie Brown to anybody who's trying to build a turf system. My whole concept of politics is the volunteer level, is very low-visibility, very low-access. I mean, anybody from any walk of life should be able to be president or governor or Senator or congressman or whatever. I don't like these people almost conspiring to develop situations whereby only the preferred few really have access to the higher places. That bothers me cause I'm a little-people's man. I'm not a king-maker's man.
- Sharp: Some of the things you've been doing in the party since you've been its chair, like encouraging Hispanics to become part of it-- Is that new for the party in California?
- Reinecke: Well, to some extent, yes. The party never did anything against them, but we've been a pretty stuffy party and not a very gracious party. While we took a lot of things for granted, we never went out of our way to say, "Welcome" to a black or Hispanic or a whatever. And I did. I've gone out of my way a long way, and I've done everything I could to open the party to all sorts of ethnic and racial groups in this so-called outreach program.

California

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Deaths

San Francisco Examiner
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Reinecke back from political exile Heads state Republican Party, leaves Watergate scandal behind

By Carl Irving
Examiner staff writer

SACRAMENTO — After nearly a decade of silence, the cheering resumes next weekend for Ed Reinecke.

The former lieutenant governor, who found his successful political career suddenly eclipsed by the Watergate scandal, becomes two-year chairman of the California Republican Party at its annual convention here. He assumes a crucial role in attempting to keep the two wings, conservative and moderate, glued together through the big campaigns of 1984.

Reinecke may be expected to receive a roar of

In 1973, former Lt. Gov. Ed Reinecke found his successful political career suddenly eclipsed by the Watergate scandal

applause as he takes office by acclamation, marking his first return to the public eye after having been swallowed up in 1973 during the scandals that spread from the Nixon White House.

"They think the guy got taken," says a veteran Republican leader. "There's a big sympathy aspect."

After being indicted for perjury, Reinecke found himself deserted by party leaders and financial backers, and saw his promising bid for governor as Ronald Reagan's protégé melt away. He was given 18 months' probation and forced to resign from office, ruined politically and financially.

As for those traumatic events of the past, Reinecke, now 58, says he has "washed all that out of my mind. Everyone feels it was a bad call and I was unfairly treated."

In February 1973, the polls showed Lt. Gov. Reinecke leading Houston Fluornoy, then state

controller, by 52 to 22 percent in the race for the GOP nomination for governor. In April, he was indicted on three counts of perjury by a Watergate grand jury in Washington.

Reinecke was accused of lying to a U.S. Senate committee on the timing of a \$400,000 offer from International Telephone and Telegraph Corp. and its Sheraton subsidiary to help finance the 1972 GOP national convention in San Diego. An anti-trust case against ITT was settled after Reinecke allegedly phoned U.S. Attorney General John Mitchell about the offer.

By April, his campaign contributions had been reduced to a trickle. He was questioned at every campaign stop about the indictment and his trial, coming up in Washington after the primary. Fluornoy won the primary by more than a 2-1 margin.

His wife and three children wept after a jury

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 convicted Reinecke following a 12-day trial. He had testified that he told Mitchell during a telephone call about the TPR pledge, but denied lying about it to the Senate committee. He said he was not asked at the hearing about any telephone conversations and did not regard a phone call as a discussion. He said he had become tired and confused by the long series of questions.

In October 1974, Reinecke was given an 18-month suspended sentence. His attorney said he had been "destroyed" by his own honesty in cooperating with Watergate prosecutors.

Reinecke, who then resigned as lieutenant governor, said, "As a man who feels strongly he is not guilty, any sentence is wrong. But I am grateful to the judge for suspending the sentence."

So next weekend's events will be sort of a resurrection, and Reinecke will take advantage of the occasion to revitalize his party. His acceptance speech will dwell on broadening the base of the GOP by moving out of the suburbs and into what he defines as minority and ethnic areas of California.

With Republicans now holding only a third of the seats in the state Legislature and among members of the California congressional delegation, and with the Democrats apparently having locked up the present political boundaries for the rest of the decade, his party must go "downtown" from the suburbs, Reinecke says.

After nearly a decade of ranching, selling real estate and activity in local party campaigns and politics, Reinecke believes he has some fresh perspectives to bring to his party.

"We must project a genuine image; that the Republican party is the one with compassion and understanding. . . I'm totally in agreement in giving people opportunity, and they

will do it for themselves, but there are a lot who need a helping hand along with the opportunity."

This is not the kind of message that Reinecke delivered as spokesman for the party's conservative wing as lieutenant governor or, earlier, as a congressman from the San Fernando Valley.

But after his sentencing, the Reineckes settled on a cattle ranch they'd purchased near Placerville in El Dorado County. The children attended country schools, he expanded into the real estate business in El Dorado and even operated a restaurant for a while. In between, Reinecke supported local Republican candidates and kept in touch with the statewide party.

"He brings appreciation of practical problems of candidates," says the Republican minority leader in the Assembly, Robert Naylor of Menlo Park. "He has acquaintances and friends in all camps."

Mike Carrington, chief of staff for State Sen. H.L. Richardson of Los Angeles, an outspoken conservative, uses almost identical words to describe the new chairman.

"He is a classic man of the people," says Carrington. "He has rapport with the hierarchy of the party, too. He's also a very nice person, very genuine."

With this kind of support behind him, Reinecke hopes to persuade Republicans to begin what he calls "one-to-one" efforts to help others, to show that Republicans have compassion.

During the past year, he worked with the present chairman, Tirso del Junco, to establish Hispanic, Chinese, American and Japanese American "councils" to expand Republican support among these ethnic groups. A black council had been established earlier. Reinecke plans to add a council to include those of eastern European descent.



Rich Pardonelli

Reinecke: And it's been very successful, I think. We've got a lot of people in now, I'd say, maybe 20-25 percent of the party is now other than white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant--WASP-types. I think it's not only healthy, it's a matter of absolute necessity if the party is going to continue.

The composition of California is not white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, whether you like it or not, we've got a large Hispanic population, we've got a large black, and a large oriental, a very large Filipino. The third largest component of our population are Filipinos. So we have a Filipino club, and that's the man I'm meeting, is the president of that club, here, in a few minutes.

And besides, I just like people. I don't care where they come from or how much money they've got or how much money they don't have. That's not important.

Sharp: I'm wondering if you might assess Reagan's efforts to bring minorities to him when he was governor. I know that in '66 there were some black Reagan campaign offices established, like in LA and some of these other places. Then, of course, he did have the appointments within his governor's office.

Reinecke: Bob [Robert J.] Keyes was one.

Sharp: Bob Keyes, Melvin Bradley, and Martin Dinkins. And then Armand Delgado.

Reinecke: Yes, that's right. I'd forgotten him.

Sharp: He was the Hispanic representative. Was that as genuine as the efforts that are going on now, or how would you put that on a scale?

Reinecke: I think they were genuine. Well, in terms of campaign offices, no. That's handled by the campaign consultants or the managers or whoever, and that really has nothing to do with Reagan's philosophy or likes or dislikes. That's just done as a practicality, really. When you're governor or even, you know, almost any higher office, you don't have a chance to even know where these headquarters are. You don't go to them, and so that's done by the consultants. So that would not have any relationship at all.

As far as people in his office, I think Ron--the president is very straight. I mean, he's very open-minded. He likes everybody based on the fact that they're human beings, not that they're white, black, or red or anything else. So I think, probably, there was a

Reinecke: recommendation that we've got to have a black representative for a community relations guy, as Bob Keyes was, and it was obvious that they chose Bob for that purpose, because he could communicate and relate better in the black communities. But I don't think there should be a negative connotation to it.

I think Reagan can get along very well with people of any walk of life. He's a very straight, very warm, very genuine individual.

The people around him aren't necessarily. Some are, some aren't, but I mean, historically and over time, you'll get aberrations from either this boy scout approach to things that I've described, based on what somebody else wants or who somebody else wants to hire. Because Reagan himself didn't hire his own staff. You know, he'd hire the top three or four, and then they'd hire everybody else.

So it isn't a positive or a negative thing. I just don't think it really relates too closely. But I do think he had a very sincere attitude and feeling toward wanting to have a representative staff, that's all.

Sharp: Okay, that's all my questions.

Reinecke: Okay, that's a bunch.

Transcriber: Lindy Berman

Final Typist: Keiko Sugimoto

TAPE GUIDE -- Ed Reinecke

Interview 1: June 26, 1984

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Interview 2: July 12, 1984

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APPENDIX

CALIFORNIA: IMPACT OF MODEL CITIES AND
REVENUE SHARING ISSUES

Prepared by

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for

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CHAPTER II

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS1. Impact of Local Model Cities Programs

Based on an evaluation of the eleven California programs in light of their contributions to improvements in local government organization, as well as enhancement of the quality of life in Model Neighborhoods, MKGK has found that, in less than four years, most of these local programs have had a substantial impact in one or more of the following areas:

- Additional services, jobs, and community improvements;
- Increased citizen involvement in community decision-making;
- Greater coordination and linkages between city, county, and Federal agencies, as well as private agencies; and
- Enhanced capacity to plan and develop programs directed at the total spectrum of urban problems, and to evaluate the results of such programs.

2. Need for an Effective State Role

Despite the gains made by local programs, the full potential of the Model Cities experiment has not been realized, partially due to inadequate State assistance. The State is an inevitable participant in local Model Cities Programs through State agency control of channels of funding under Federal categorical aid programs, yet several barriers have limited the State effort:

- Lack of understanding of and substantive commitment to the Model Cities Program;
- Minimal coordination and information exchange at the State level;
- Emphasis on serving the "total community" rather than special target areas; and
- Difficulties in accommodating State requirements to innovative "demonstration" projects in Model Cities.

3. Role of the State Model Cities Liaison Group (MCLG) in Overcoming Barriers to Effective State Assistance

The MCLG was established to provide a State-level Model Cities support function and to overcome barriers to effective Model Cities assistance in essentially five basic ways:

- Information: Educate State officials and provide State resource information to Model Cities;

- Liaison: Act as a communication link connecting CDAs to Federal, State, and county agencies;
- Coordination: Coordinate independent State, Federal, and local programs in order to concentrate resources on locally-defined Model Cities needs;
- Technical Assistance: Train Model Cities staff, assist them in developing and operating projects, and obtain a broad range of technical assistance for Model Cities from State agencies; and
- Advocacy: Act as a State-level advocate for local Model Cities needs by reviewing and initiating legislative proposals, recommending administrative changes, and expediting State agency assistance to Model Cities.

4. Difficulties of State-Level Model Cities Support Function

The MCLG has not been able to carry out an adequate program of State support for Model Cities, for reasons largely outside its control:

- Lack of commitment of the State to the MCLG, expressed through insufficient staffing and funding, as well as inability to implement express State legislative policy mandates;
- Disinterest and lack of cooperation from individual State agencies;
- Absence of high level direction of MCLG staff efforts and lack of long-range progress due to low visibility and staff changes;
- Inability of MCLG staff to develop concentrated initiatives in support of Model Cities, due to a "scatterization" of staff efforts; and
- Resultant low visibility and lack of impact of MCLG, and State assistance in general, in the State.

5. Limited Capacity at State and Local Levels to Meet Challenge of Revenue Sharing

The challenge of revenue sharing to the cities is obvious and direct. The cities must develop the capacity to plan for the allocation of general and special revenue sharing funds, and to manage and evaluate resulting programs. The challenge to the State is more fundamental. Despite the "urban strategy" of the Federal government apparent in revenue sharing initiatives, the ability of cities to fulfill the significant role seemingly devolved upon them is dependent, to a large degree, upon powers and assistance flowing to them through the State. With the retreat of the Federal government from direct urban involvement, the role of the State will be enhanced substantially. However, both the State and local levels of government may be unable to meet the challenge of revenue sharing, due to:

- Dearth of professional personnel at the local level, especially in smaller cities;
- Lack of program management and evaluation experience in many city administrations, as well as unwillingness to utilize the Model Cities experience in this regard;
- Conflict between residents and City Hall;
- Lack of meaningful linkages between cities and State agencies, due to traditional relationships of the State with counties and special districts and the inability of the MCLG to significantly involve Model Cities with the State; and
- Absence of coordinative mechanisms to facilitate State-level urban assistance.

6. Need for New and Vigorous Role of State Assistance to Cities for the Revenue Sharing Era

The State must assume a new and much more vigorous role of assistance to the cities to meet the challenge of the revenue sharing era. Whatever the form, organizationally, that the State chooses to assume in order to assist the cities, at least the following functions should be carried on:

- Research
- Technical assistance in planning, availability of State programs;
- Demonstration programs, including the use of State revenue sharing monies as an inducement - possibly on a matching basis - to cities to concentrate on certain State priority areas, such as local government reorganization, tax reduction, and criminal justice;
- Education and training programs for local professionals;
- Review of local government organization and functions with a view to strengthening the role of the local chief executive; consolidation of local government functions in the sense of eliminating unnecessary special districts and independent agencies; review of local process decisions, if consolidation or reorganization is impractical, in order to give the chief executive greater knowledge of and control over allocation and planning activities in his jurisdiction; and
- Comprehensive review of State programs affecting cities with a view to simplifying and consolidating these programs in order to facilitate the ability of local jurisdictions to utilize State assistance. This comprehensive review would also include analysis of authority patterns among State agencies serving cities, conflicts between legislative and administrative criteria governing programs, timing of fund disbursement patterns in order to achieve greater linkages with local programs, and review of processing times and procedures for applications coming from local jurisdictions.

7. State Urban Affairs Responsibilities and the California Council on Intergovernmental Relations/Office of Intergovernmental Management

Although this report has focused on the eleven local Model Cities Programs in California, and the role of the State in assisting such local programs, the need for state-level assistance to all cities and local governments in California is clear. However, this recommendation emphasizes State assistance to urban communities.

To strengthen urban capacities and to improve State response to urban needs, the California Council on Intergovernmental Relations/Office of Intergovernmental Management should be assigned the responsibility to coordinate the activities of State agencies and departments, with direct program responsibility for urban affairs. An advisory board to CCIR/OIM, consisting of representatives from appropriate State agencies and departments, should be established. The CCIR/OIM staff would have the responsibility for coordinating the activities of the agencies concerned, particularly as it relates to State provision of fiscal and technical assistance to urban areas. The CCIR/OIM is within the Governor's Office and is presently responsible for local government liaison efforts, and it is, therefore, currently appropriate for this new responsibility.

The first task of the CCIR/OIM staff would be to conduct a comprehensive review of State programs and procedures of assistance to cities and urban counties. It would then make recommendations for administrative and legislative consolidation and simplification of State aid to cities and counties. It would coordinate State programs of technical assistance research, demonstration grants, and education and training directed to the covered local governments, with particular focus on strengthening the local governments. Legislation would be necessary to clarify the relationship of the CCIR/OIM responsibilities to individual State agencies and departments. This would avoid the major problem facing the MCLG, the Office of Intergovernmental Management, and the California Council on Intergovernmental Relations, namely, a lack of visibility and authority vis-a-vis other State agencies. (See Chapter IV, "State Urban Affairs Responsibilities" section, for expansion of this recommendation.)

8. Merge Functions of MCLG with CCIR/OIM and its New Responsibilities

The responsibilities of the MCLG should be totally subsumed within the CCIR/OIM and its new responsibilities. The MCLG is not effective as a separate unit; however, as a component of an expanded State-level urban assistance function, the MCLG could focus its efforts on those urban areas containing Model Cities Programs. With the heightened State support behind such a new initiative toward the cities, the potential for effective State assistance to Model Cities would also be enhanced.

CHAPTER III

THE MODEL CITIES PROGRAM: AN OVERVIEW

The Demonstration Cities Act was passed by the Congress in the late Fall of 1966 with high expectations. The bill's sponsors anticipated that the new program, soon to be known as Model Cities, would be highly effective in treating a wide range of urban problems in selected cities. The program would concentrate Federal and other resources on locally-designated Model Neighborhood Areas (MNAs), thereby permitting a more visible and measurable demonstration of the impact of comprehensive Federal assistance.

Model Cities was to have a life span of six years, the first of which would be devoted exclusively to planning. The end product of this Planning Year would be a Comprehensive Demonstration Plan (CDP). The CDP -- including a problem analysis of the Model Neighborhood Area, a statement of program goals and objectives, a list of projects to be implemented, and non-programmatic sections on citizen participation, administration, and continuous planning and evaluation -- was to indicate fairly precisely what the program intended to accomplish in the following Action Year. Eventually, there would be five action years, the CDP being continuously revised and up-dated to meet changing conditions and requirements.

The role of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in Model Cities was a varied one. Under the enabling legislation, HUD was assigned administrative responsibility for the program within the Federal government. Towards this end, a Model Cities Administration was created within the Department and charged with direct responsibility for the new program. As part of its mandate, HUD was expected to supervise the distribution and spending of "supplemental monies," the principle Federal support funds for Model Cities. Finally, HUD would provide assistance to Model Cities in various technical fields, including internal program management, continuous planning and evaluation, and in functional areas related to the program. Where HUD itself could not directly provide needed services, it would make available the necessary consultant assistance.

In line with the program's emphasis on comprehensive planning -- that is, planning that would include economic, social, and physical concerns -- Model Cities was to bring to bear on the designated neighborhood the full range of Federal urban programs. HUD was to be the principal agent soliciting cooperation from other Federal departments. A key Model Cities actor was the HUD Leadman. Stationed in the regional offices of HUD, leadmen were assigned specific Model Cities and charged with responsibility for monitoring local program activities, interpreting HUD requirements and guidelines, and providing various forms of assistance to cities. The principal guidelines for HUD influence over local programs were several "CDA Letters" in such areas as planning, citizen participation, and resident employment.

There were two forms of direct HUD financial assistance to Model Cities. The first was a planning grant award, made by HUD after review and approval of an application. This award was to underwrite the preparation of the Comprehensive Demonstration Plan, in conjunction with what other Federal and local assistance could be found. The second form of support was the "supplemental entitlement," based on a certain percentage of existing Federal funding directed to the Model Neighborhood Area at the time the application was made. The supplemental entitlement was to be forthcoming after acceptance and approval by HUD of the CDP, and would be renewed at the same level for each of the ensuing action years. Neither planning grant nor supplemental funds would be released until the city had made appropriate revisions, requested by HUD through the Regional Interagency Coordinating Committee, in their application and CDP, respectively. The supplemental monies could be used for a diversity of purposes, including funding the CDA, encouraging new and innovative projects, and serving as matching funds for appropriate Federal and state categorical programs.

Ultimately, there were two rounds of Model Cities planning grant awards. The first round of seventy-five grants was announced in November, 1967, and the second round, also of seventy-five cities, followed in the Fall of 1968.

The significance of Model Cities lay both in its complexity and comprehensiveness. Not only was the program a highly rationalized one, with specific structural, procedural, and product requirements, but it also sought to integrate social, physical, and economic elements into a linked set of goals and objectives. In this sense, Model Cities stood out from such more or less single-focused modes of Federal intervention as the Community Action Program (social planning) or Urban Renewal (physical planning).

The Action Years

The five action years in the Model Cities Program were much more complex than the planning year. Once the Comprehensive Demonstration Plan had been approved by the Department of Housing and Urban Development, City Demonstration Agencies (CDAs) were faced with implementing that Plan, as well as evaluating the success of their efforts and developing a succeeding action year program. Where CDAs during the planning year were able to focus their efforts on a planning process which they could themselves largely control, once implementation began they had to rely on other local agencies to carry out their plan. In addition, if their program were to be successful, they would have to obtain categorical monies from Federal and state agencies. In essence, Model Cities would significantly expand its scope of activities and include many more actors than had been required for the planning year.

Following submission of the CDP, cities generally had to wait for a Federal agency review of that document. This review focused on citizen participation, availability of Federal categorical monies, linkages with local agencies, and the adequacy of continuous planning and evaluation plans. The Federal agency review preceded any release of funds for implementation of projects. For many cities, this review was highly time-consuming, impeding the effective start of projects.

Basically, the action years of the Model Cities Program consisted of three related segments; implementation of the projects proposed in the CDP;

evaluation of project and program success; continuous planning, that is, preparation of the next year's program. In HUD's view, these three tasks were sequential in nature, with implementation being a necessary prerequisite to evaluation, evaluation preceding continuous planning.

Implementation was to involve several different and often complex steps. Thus, contracts had to be signed with project sponsors or operators. The negotiations surrounding these contracts were seldom easy, since they covered such points as resident employment, citizen participation, and continuous monitoring and evaluation by the CDA. Few agencies enjoyed subjecting themselves to these conditions. The CDA, at the same time, had to choose the sponsors for its projects, since the Administration insisted that neither the CDA itself nor resident boards associated with the program be permitted to sponsor projects. Existing agencies were to be utilized but, given resident resentment of many of these agencies, agreement on a contract was often difficult. Finally, those projects which were completely new to the city, or which were designed to force their sponsors to change their traditional way of doing business, encountered substantial delays. Implementation, in many instances, proved to be a much more time-consuming task than anyone had imagined. Action "years" were often much longer than a calendar year.

Evaluation and Continuous Planning, although expected to follow soon after project implementation, were often sacrificed to implementation. Evaluation was to provide information on project effectiveness and efficiency, and the results were to be fed into continuous planning. Thus, in the succeeding action years, projects would be improved, while others could be dropped based on the evaluation findings. Continuous planning was to follow much the same orderly and logical approach characteristic of the planning year model.

State Role

The state role in Model Cities was at best ambiguous. Essentially, Model Cities was designed to by-pass the states, which were seen by certain Federal agencies as obstacles to improvement of urban conditions. Thus, Federal funding for Model Cities went to the cities directly, without state agency or gubernatorial sign-off.

Although the state role in Model Cities was to be a limited one, there were several areas where state involvement was potentially important. Thus, many of the projects planned by CDAs involved in such areas as health, welfare, law enforcement, employment, economic development, education, and rehabilitation, where state activity was already pronounced. Applications for Federal categorical applications were, in many cases, funneled through or reviewed by appropriate state agencies. In some states, such as Pennsylvania, substantial grants were made available to Model Cities for planning and action purposes. In various functional areas, state departments and agencies made technical assistance available to CDAs, usually upon local request. In addition, state agencies were, in several functional areas, being requested by HUD to assist in the review of CDPs.

One important area regarding a state Model Cities role is related to the CDA "sign-off" program initiated by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. HEW requested that its categorical grant programs, where these affected a MNA, be approved by ("signed off") the local CDA director and chief

executive. In several states, this effort has occasioned substantial infighting among state agencies and CDAs, since the latter interpreted their right to sign-off to mean the right to review a range of state programs which had previously operated independently of city hall, as in education and rehabilitation.

The California Effort

Recognizing the need for some kind of state involvement in Model Cities, HUD's Model Cities Administration in 1969 initiated a series of grants to support states in the formation of Model Cities liaison and technical assistance units.

California was among the first states to receive Federal assistance for these coordinative purposes. In 1969, it established by Executive Order a Model Cities Liaison Group (MCLG), and located this unit in the Office of the Lieutenant Governor. It is currently located in the Office of Intergovernmental Management (OIM), in the Governor's Office. Additionally, the Federal government has funded specialized Model Cities technical assistance units within the State Departments of Education and Public Health.

In 1971, the California Model Cities effort was enhanced by the adoption of AB 3055. This legislation emphasized the need for "significant State interest and cooperation" as key factors for the success of these programs in the State. In particular, the legislation indicated its perception of Model Cities as providing an opportunity to develop innovative programs, particularly those "programs which would integrate or combine the specialized services of various departments and agencies of State government."

The bill called for the Governor to appoint a Model Cities Coordinator, whose responsibilities were to include the following:

- solicit requests through specified State departments from local Model Cities Programs and see to it that these requests are fulfilled
- coordinate all Model Cities State activities, including formation of interdepartmental task forces, as appropriate
- serve as principal liaison officer between the State government and local communities
- prepare a State Guide for Model Cities
- prepare an annual report on the State role in Model Cities

In addition to these designated functions, the Model Cities Coordinator was to assist in the development of interdisciplinary programs in such fields as early childhood development, criminal rehabilitation (as opposed to incarceration), and community services.

AB 3055 further called for the designation of local liaison personnel in selected State departments "to assist each of the Model Cities Programs in the State." Local Model Cities resources boards could be established by the Model Cities Coordinator to assist him in his duties. Composed of local liaison personnel, these resources boards were to meet with local officials, including residents, to improve the level of State coordination and assistance in local programs.

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